INDO - AMERICAN RELTAIONS (1962 - 1966)

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PREFACE

The international environment in the sixties was marked by a gradual decline in the rigours of the Cold War paving the way to a painful transition from bipolarity to multipolarity.

The period under the present study (1962 - 1966) saw, however, rising tensions in the South Asian region including two major border conflicts between India and the Peoples' Republic of China, and between India and Pakistan, in both of which the United States of America did play a very crucial role vis-a-vis India. While at the beginning of the period, one finds unprecedented upswing in the relations between India and the United States, at the end of the same one can discern a marked decline in the latter characterised by peacemaking at Tashkent. It was a period of coming of age for India's foreign policy.

The study seeks to concentrate on political, military and diplomatic reactions between India and the United States, excluding, however, economic, cultural and other related aspects. The methodology followed is historical and analytical, covering primary and secondary sources.

The first chapter traces the history of India-United States relations in the perspective of India's struggle for freedom. The second chapter seeks to place their relations in the context of the emergence of India's independent foreign policy, more so, its vital ingredient and innovation of non-alignment in the world-canvass of the Cold War. The third brings it down to the specifics

of the Kashmir problem and the Pakistani connection of the United States, specially, the question of military aid, while the fourth covers the international crises over the Suez and Hungary. The study proper begins in the fifth chapter wherein, in the background of the border conflict with the Peoples' Republic of China, the intensive interaction between India and the United States has been analysed in terms of military aid, the induced India-Pakistan talks over Kashmir, the Voice of America episode, the ouster of V.K. Krishna Menon, and pressures to give up non-alognment. The sixth chapter concentrates on the border conflicts with Pakistan (1965) in the Rann of Kutch and then in Kashmir. The seventh chapter focuses on the Tashkent Conference around which the study ends alongwith a conclusive chapter in which the findings are included.

I extend my sincerest gratitude to my Supervisor, Professor S.A.H. Haqqi, Head, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, without whose valuable guidance and encouragement it would not have been possible for me to complete the present study.

Thanks are also due to the staff and the authorities of the National Library and the American Centers (Calcutta), the Indian Council of World Affairs Library and the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Library (New Delhi), the Seminar Library, Department of Political Science and the Maulana Azad Library (Aligarh Muslim University), the Eastern Regional Centre of the Indian Council of Social Science Research and the University Grants Commission for the provision of Teacher Fellowship under the Faculty Improvement Programme.

I extend my thanks to Shri Sitesh Ganguly for extending hospitality for my stay in Calcutta, to Shri Maitreya Chatak for the same in New Delhi, and to Mr. Abdul Aleem Ansari for undertaking all the trouble for typing.

More than thanks are due to my wife, Sukla, and my son, Kaustuv, for bearing with me, and fending for themselves on the home front alongwith my mother.

I devote the present study to the hallowed memory of my father, late Shri Khagendrabhusan Biswas, who enthused me to launch myself on the project, and whom I lost on March 16, 1979.

I am responsible for all the limitations of the study.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

HISTORIC ERRORS

On October 12, 1492, Christobal Colon, in the course of a historic error,[1] discovered America. It was a mistake which left some significant and symbolic links[2] in the form of common values and ideals[3] between the United States of America and India.

UNWRITTEN ALLIANCE

The glorious ideals as well as the leaders of the American Revolution had inspired India's struggle for freedom which led Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, on his first visit to the United States, to pay eloquent tributes to 'the torchbearers of freedom'.[4]

Before Independence, the American Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) had directly influenced its Indian counterpart (January 26, 1930)[5] and later, the new constitution of India also came to be strongly influenced by its illustrious predecessor.[6]

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1. M.V. Kamath, The United States and India, 1776-1976 (Washington: Embassy of India, 1976), p. 9; M.K. Manchanda, India and America: Historical Links, 1776-1920 (Chandigarh: Young Men Hamilap, 1976), p. 1.

2. N.A. Palkhivala, 'U.S.-India Relations: The New Potential', East-West Perspectives (Hawaii), Summer, 1979, p. 30.

3. The Statesman (Delhi), February 20, 1980.

4. J. Nehru, Visit to America (New York: John Day, 1950), p. 4.

5. Kamath, n. 1, pp. 110-115.

6. Nehru, n. 4, pp. 5-6 and 135.

India, the largest democracy, and the United States, the second largest, but the most powerful democracy on earth, "share practical experience with democracy"[7], as U.S. President Jimmy Carter observed which constituted, as it had been most appropriately observed[8], an unwritten alliance between these two countries.

Both are open societies which highly value the freedom of the individual, the deprivation of which leads to the very undoing of a nation itself[9], and gradually, both have come to emphasize the importance of human rights.[10]

As both have woven a "vast mosaic of humanity into a single nation"[11], a spirit of accommodation and tolerance constitute the fundamental principle in both these countries while a strong urge towards spiritualism pervades their lives. For instance, Thoreau and Emerson, who were influenced by ancient Indian wisdom, influenced Gandhi very greatly[12] who, in his turn, exerted considerable

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7. Palkhivala, n.2, p. 28; J. Carter, Toward Our Common Goals, January 1-3, 1978 (New Delhi: USIS).

8. P.K. Banerjee, India and America: An Alliance of Values (Washington: Information Service of India, 1967), p. 31; C. Bowles, Indian-American Relations (Ahmedabad: M.L. Institute, 1966), p. 7; M.L. Palmer, Indo-American Relations in the Seventies (Ahmedabad: M.L. Institute, 1972), p.29; S.G.Harrison (ed.), India and the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 32, 58 and 59.

9. Nehru, n. 4, p. 136; B.N. Chakravarty, India Speaks to America (Orient Longmans, 1966), p.1; M.C. Chagla, Our Two Countries: India and America (Washington: Information Service of India, 1961), p. 32; Banerjee, n.8, pp. 20-22.

10. Carter, n.7, pp. 13-14; Chagla, n.9, pp. 70 and 92; Palkhivala, n. 7, p. 28.

11. Carter, n.7, p. 13.

12. A. Guy Hope, America and Swaraj (Bombay: Vora, 1970), p.109; Banerjee, n. 8, pp. 4-5.

influence later on the Civil Rights Movement in the United States.[13]

In the arena of international affairs, both the nations "share the common goals of peace in the world"[14], and are guided by a certain "basic community of purposes" and aim at "cooperation and international understanding"[15].

In order to prevent war and to ensure peace, both India and the United States believe in the efficacy of the United Nations Organization.[16]

The similarity of their views in the sphere of international relations led the famous Delhi Declaration to proclaim: "Beyond the traditional ideas of statecraft, Indians and Americans recognize an obligation to themselves and to others that ends can never justify evil means. Nations, like individuals, are morally responsible for their actions".[17]

INDIA'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND THE U.S.

British colonialism provided the earliest links between India and America. Even before the Revolution, the depredations carried on by the officials of the East India Company in India became notorious in the American colonies.[18]

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13. Banerjee, Ibid.; Carter, n.7, pp. 23-24; Chakravarty, n.9, pp. 194-95.
14. Carter, Ibid.,p.22; Nehru, n.4, pp.8-9 and 29-30.
15. U.S. Secretary of State, H. Kissinger and India's Minister for External Affairs, Y.B.Chavan, in the Span, December,1975,p.3.
16. Carter, n. 7, p. 28; Henceforth U.N.
17. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
18. Kamath, n.1, pp. 23-25.

In the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, some sympathetic Americans concerned themselves with the sad plight of the Indian people. On April 12, 1794, William Duane was arrested in Calcutta, and then deported from India, for having published anti-government articles in his paper, The World.[19] George Kitteridge, the U.S. Consul in Bombay, is said to have financed the Indian National Congress in its early years.[20] Brooks Adams in his famous work, The Law of Civilisation and Decay, in 1896, focussed upon the plunder of India by the British.[21]

The British excesses to suppress the Indian Mutiny of 1857 drew adverse comments in the U.S. press.[22]

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, the United States had reached the turning-point in its history when it launched itself on an expansionist course in the international arena, and captured Philippines from Spain in 1898. This initiated an era of Anglo-American friendship which was to exert a tremendous influence on U.S. foreign policy, and world history, for years to come.[23]

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20. D.P. Singh, American Attitude Towards the Indian Nationalist Movement (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1974), p. 9.

21. B. Adams, The Law of Civilisation and Decay (Alfred A. Knoff, 1943; reprint), pp. 297-300; Singh, n. 20, pp. 19-21.

22. M. Jha, Civil Disobedience and After: The American Reaction to Political Developments in India During 1930-1935 (Meerut: Meenakshi, 1973), p. 5; Singh, n.20, pp. 17-18; for the U.S. Consul General's views; Bhagat, n.19, p. 125; for support to the British Government by Americans in India.

23. J.W. Pratt, A History of U.S. Foreign Policy (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 202; W.S. Churchill, A History of the English Speaking Peoples (New York: Lodd Mead, 1958), Vol. IV, p. 332.

19. G. Bhagat, Americans in India, 1784-1860 (New York: University Press, 1970), pp. 117-122.

In India, the beginning of the twentieth century saw the rise of the Swadeshi Movement (1905-1910) as a protest against the British Government's partition of Bengal. It transformed itself into a campaign for the boycott of foreign goods and the British Government launched severe repression. As the Movement affected U.S. commercial interests also, official reaction was not favourable.[24] However, eminent public figures like Mark Twain, and Andrew Carnagie, and a section of the U.S. press severely criticised British rule in India during this period.[25] Democratic Party leader W.J. Bryan, who visited India in 1906, severely condemned the British for having led millions to the "peace of the grave" and having "legalized pillage", and evaluated the British rule in India as worse than that of the Czar.[26]

Conscious as the British were of the gradual erosion of their image in the United States, and the developing sympathy for India, they sought the help of the highest official quarters, and President Theodore Roosevelt, in the course of a speech in the Washington, D.C., on January 18, 1909, in the first Presidential speech on India, commended the British rule as among "the most admirable achievements of the white race during the past centuries"

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24. Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908 (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1973), pp. 137-48; Singh, n. 20, pp. 30-31 and also Chapter II, for U.S. Consul's attitude.

25. Singh, n. 20, pp. 87, and 93-94.

26. Bryan was thrice candidate for the Presidency, and later, the U.S. Secretary of State (1913-15); Jha, n. 22, pp. 7-8; Singh, n. 20, pp. 84-85.

which drew sharp retort from a group of eminent Americans[27] unfortunately, however, only to be contradicted by the next U.S. President, who expressed views along the lines of his immediate predecessor.[28]

India's search for freedom, soon led to the establishment of the Gadar Party (1913), with headquarters at San Francisco, by a group of militant Indian emigres with the aim of over-throwing British rule in India through armed rebellion. With the approach of the First World War, as relations between United States and Germany rapidly deteriorated, and the British Government also exerted pressure on the United States, and also because of the Gadar movement's German connections, and abortive attempts to stir up rebellion in India, the U.S. Government ultimately came down heavily on the Gadar Party with the San Francisco Trial (1917-18). However, Indians in the United States continued to campaign for the independence of India in a persistent manner.[29]

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27. Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) was one of the architects of the expansionist course in U.S. foreign policy and was a personal friend of the British Secretary of State, John Morley (1905-10); See, C. and M. Beard, Basic History of the United States (Philadelphia: New Home Library, 1944), pp. 338-41 and 350-53; Singh, n. 20, pp. 87-93, for Roosevelt's relations with the British; Ibid., pp. 94-98, for rejoinder by a group of Americans for Roosevelt's racialist attitudes; Ibid., pp. 99-100, for W.H. Hearst's condemnation of Roosevelt's speech as a treason to the Republic.

28. Singh, Ibid., pp. 102-3.

29. K.K. Banerjee, Indian Freedom Movement: Revolutionaries in America (Calcutta: Jijnasa, 1969); G.S. Deol, The Role of the Gadar Party in the National Movement (New Delhi: Sterling, 1969); S.S. Josh, Hindustan Gadar Party: A Short History (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1978), 2 Vols.; also Hope, n. 12, pp. 17-23, for Indian campaign for freedom in the United States.

After the First World War, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918)[30] created high hopes in India, with the Indian National Congress calling for its application to India[31] in its thirty-third session in New Delhi (December 26, 1918). The receipt by B.G. Tilak of an assurance on behalf of the U.S. President[32] raised such hopes further while Sir S.Iyer of Madras had despatched a letter to the President on the issue, which received wide publicity, and created interest in U.S.official circles, because of some favourable military implications, but both of which ultimately bore no fruit.[33]

The Jalianwala Bagh massacre (April 13, 1919) drew severe condemnation in the U.S. Congress by Senators J.I. France (October 9, 1919) and G.W. Norris (February 27, 1920), which led Congressman W.E. Mason (March 2, 1920) to move a concurrent resolution on India's Independence.[34]

The emergence of M.K. Gandhi as the leader of the nationalist movement in India created considerable interest in the United States though the evaluation of Gandhi differed widely, ranging from the embodiment of reaction[35] to the greatest man in the world.[36]

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30. Pratt, n.23, pp. 275, 279 and 284-85.

31. P. Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress, Vol.I (1885-1935), (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1969), pp. 157-58.

32. Jha, n. 22, pp.13-16; Kamath, n. 1, p. 109.

33. Jha, Ibid., Kamath, Ibid.,pp.109-110;Manchanda,n.1, Ch.7, and pp. 213-16.

34. Singh, n. 20, pp. 235-37.

35. Christian Science Monitor (Boston), July 7, 1921.

36. C. Seshachari, Gandhi and the American Scene: An Intellectual History and Inquiry(Bombay: Nachiketa, 1969), p. 29; for Rev. J.H. Holmes' declaration on April 10, 1921 in the Community Church, New York; Kamath, n. 1, pp. 107-8.

On the outbreak of the Second World War, the Indian National Congress and the British Government moved on a collision course. The I.N.C., which stood consistently against fascism, wanted to participate in the War as a free nation and hence, demanded immediate freedom and bitterly resented the Viceroy's declaration of India as belligerent without caring to consult Indian opinion.[37] As the British Government refused to concede its demands, the I.N.C. expressed its inability to support the British war effort and launched individual Satyagraha movement (Nehru was arrested on October 30, 1940).

Though at the beginning of the Second World War President F.D. Roosevelt had proclaimed neutrality (September 5, 1939), he wanted to prevent Axis Victory in every possible way, and to help the Allies as far as possible[38] and this basic approach ultimately gave birth to the Grand Alliance.

In the critical world situation and dangerous political stalemate in India, the Roosevelt Administration wanted to help in the hazardous process of Indian Independence. Roosevelt himself raised the issue with Prime Minister Churchill in December, 1941 to which the latter 'reacted so strongly and at such length that

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37. A.I.C.C., Congress and War Crisis (Allahabad, no date); B. Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 1885-1947 (Calcutta: Bookland, 1960), Ch. V; J. Nehru: 'India's Demand and England's Answer'; The Atlantic Monthly, April, 1940, pp. 445-55.

38. Pratt, n. 23, pp. 389-90.

he never raised it again'.[39]

Earlier, the Atlantic Charter (August 9, 1941) which raised high hopes in India[40] was openly dashed by Churchill's statement (September 9, 1941) that it was not applicable to India,[41] and Roosevelt, later on, had to contradict it politely, declaring that it applied to all humanity.[42]

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and their rapid advance, further emphasized the strategic location of India and the need for urgent efforts to end the political stalemate. On March 10, 1942, the U.S. President, in a message to Churchill, suggested a temporary and representative dominion government of India[43] which forced the latter to despatch the Cripps Mission for negotiations with the Indian nationalists amidst which Roosevelt's Pefsonal Representative Col. Louis Johnson[44] arrived (April 3, 1942) and actively participated in the same, which, however, failed.

The second Personal Representative of the President, William

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39. W.S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 209.

40. G.R. Hess, America Encounters India, 1941-1947 (Johns Hopkins, 1971), pp. 24-26; Compared with Wilson's fourteen points.

41. Ibid., pp. 28-29; Churchill had overruled the U.S.Ambassador's objection; Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941, III, p. 182.

42. The New York Times, October 28, 1942.

43. F.R.U.S., 1942, I, pp. 615-16; Churchill, n. 39, p. 214, for Churchill's reaction.

44. Hope, n. 12, pp. 60-62.

Phillips[45] arrived in New Delhi on January 8, 1943. His efforts too, achieved no greater success due to the attitude of the British Government, but the leakage of his two reports to the President helped the cause of Indian freedom by exposing the role of the conservative elements within the British Cabinet.[46]

Later on, with the approval of President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius Jr. raised the question (April 28, 1945) of Indian Independence with his British counterpart, Anthony Eden, and this pressure and interest the United States kept up till India achieved Independence[47] and when the United States of America welcomed it into the comity of nations.

CONCLUSION

The ideals of the American Revolution had influenced India's struggle for freedom, and after India achieved her freedom, certain common values can be found as the lodestars of both India and the United States.

However, the role of the United States in India's tortuous path to freedom was a mixed one. While Theodore Roosevelt, in the course of the first Presidential pronouncement on India, had nakedly sided with British imperialism, his distant cousin, however,

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45. He was former U.S. Ambassador to Italy and the then Chief of the Office of Strategic Services in London, precursor to the C.I.A., and twice Under-Secretary of State.

46. Hope, n. 12, pp. 81-84; pp.111-17 for the reports.

47. U.S. Senate, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49 (Washington: 1950), p. 782.

used subtle diplomatic persuation as well as pressure for accelerating the pace of India's Independence. The priority, however, was definitely on the Grand Alliance, and strategic considerations[48] related to the position of India for the successful prosecution of the War. Hence, Dallek concludes that his 'fundamental concern was not India's Independence'.[49] His initiatives raised high hopes in India to be followed unfortunately, by quick disillusionment, leading another American scholar to conclude that he 'sought to secure objectives in India without paying the necessary price' as a result of which the American 'standing in India ... in the immediate post-war period, reached its nadir'[50]; while two Indian scholars assessed Roosevelt's policy to have been 'largely negative'.[51] No doubt, the 'Mutual distrust between India and the United States was rooted in the 1942 crisis in India'[52] which boded ill for the future.

While official U.S. failed to fulfil the expectations of an India in quest of freedom, the spirit of 1776 was gloriously upheld mainly by certain sections of the non-official U.S. who

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48. Report of the American Technical Mission to India - Submitted to the Government of India and to the Government of the U.S., August, 1942, p. 2.

49. R. Dallek, Frankin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 327.

50. Hess, n. 40, p. 156.

51. M.S. Venkataramani and B.K. Shrivastava, Quit India: The American Response to the 1942 Struggle (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 334-35.

52. Idem.

did not fail to side with a resurgent India in its years of travail. These brave people, 'the salt of the American earth'[53], definitely deserve our salute, and gratitude, as they had provided the basis for healthy and admirable relations among these two countries in future.

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53. Idem.

CHAPTER II

THE COLD WAR AND NON-ALIGNMENT

India made her "tryst with destiny"[1] amidst tremendous internal turmoil concomitant to the partition of the country which created serious strains on her economy, and the agony took away much of the ecstasy.

The international horizon was no more promising. Even before the end of the War, Jawaharlal Nehru could foresee possibilities of conflict in the post-War world, and had concluded: 'Much will depend on American and Soviet policy and on the degrees of co-ordination or conflict between the two and Britain'[2], while Gandhi had predicted "a peace which threatens to be prelude to war bloodier still if possible"[3].

Unfortunately, however, India's apprehensions proved to be true, and by the time India became independent, the great schism between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, called the Cold War, had already set in, vitiating the

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1. J. Nehru, Independence and After (Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1949), p. 3.

2. J. Nehru, The Discovery of India (Asia: 1961), p. 580; J.F. Dulles, "The General Assembly", Foreign Affairs, October, 1945, reprinted in Armstrong, H.F.(ed.), Fifty Years of Foreign Affairs (Praeger, 1972), p. 172: 'Future peace depends above all upon accord between the Great Powers'.

3. P. Nair, Mahatma Gandhi : The Last Phase (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1956-1958), Vol. I, p. 117; Gandhi's Message to Mrs.Roosevelt on the death of President Roosevelt.

international environment.

THE COLD WAR

The Second World War saw the emergence of the United States as the most powerful state and at the head of the Western states, closely followed by the U.S.S.R. By the end of 1945, however, the wartime alliance between these two giants came to crack up,[4] leading to intense friction between the two groups of states which took the other to be the sole source of all ills and tried to combat the same by alliances, espionage, vicious propaganda and pressures all the world over, which came to be known as the Cold War.[5] Professor A. Schlesinger Jr. has defined the Cold War as 'a presumably mortal antagonism, arising in the wake of the Second World War, between two rigidly hostile blocs ... For nearly two decades this antagonism dominated the fears of mankind; it may even, on occasion, have come close to blowing up the planet'.[6] In the United States, however, the official American view painted the Cold War as the 'response of free men to communist aggresion' while the 'revisionist thesis' of the same held that aggressive U.S. policies forced the Soviet Union to adopt policies for its

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4. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 6, 1965, p. 44; There is an endless amount of literature on the Cold War including a formidable amount which is a part of it. Neither is there any agreement on the date of origin of the same, some putting it in 1945 while others going back as far as 1917.

5. E.J. McCarthy, Dictionary of American Politics (New York: Penguin, 1968), p. 28.

6. A. Schlesinger Jr., "Origins of the Cold War", Foreign Affairs, October, 1967; reprinted in n.2, p. 401.

security which resulted in the Cold War.[7]

In the then traditional U.S. view, from 1945 onwards, 'the Kremlin was perceived as the headquarters of the devil on earth ... scheming the destruction of the U.S.'[8]; to which, in retrospect, former U.S. Secretary of State, Acheson, admitted, 'might have been a case of having 'overreacted to Stalin, which in turn caused him overreact to the policies of the United States'.[9]

The Soviet Union, likewise held the United States responsible for the Cold War and considered the use of the Atom-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9, 1945) as 'the first act of a cold war against the Soviet Union'[10] to which view H.J. Laski also agreed.[11]

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7. Schlesinger, n. 6, pp. 402-3; see L.J. Halle, The Cold War as History (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967); M.F. Herz, Beginnings of the Cold War (Indiana University Press, 1966) and Mr. X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs, July, 1947, pp. 572-76; 580-82; actually authored by G.F. Kennan; for the revisionist thesis D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins (2 vols.), (New York: Doubleday, 1961); W.A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell, revised edn., 1962); also see T.E. Etzold and J.L. Gaddis (ed.), Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

8. H.J. Morgentau, "Changes and Chances in American-Soviet Relations", Foreign Affairs, April, 1971, p. 429.

9. D. Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 753; also see p. 194 on the beginning of the Cold War.

10. V. Mamontov, Disarmament: The Command of the Times (Moscow: Progress, 1979), p. 37; see also pp. 34-39 for Soviet view of the Cold War; also N. Sivachyev and E. Yazkov, History of the USA Since World War - I (Moscow: Pregress, 1976), Ch.VII; also C. Sen, Against the Cold War (Asia: 1962), p. 7.

11. H.J. Laski, "The Crisis in Our Civilization", Foreign Affairs, October, 1947, reprinted in n.2., p. 219.

However, to Indians the Cold War appeared to be 'basically a struggle for mastery between two powers'[12], which had been fortified by 'a new and explosive element, ideology'[13]. To India, it appeared that mutual distrust, fears and apprehensions mixed with a basic conflict of interests lay at the root of this dangerous development[14].

NEW INDIA AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY

Thus when the ship of the Indian state was launched in this turbulent international situation, the leadership had to be extremely cautious to avoid any collision with other powerful vessels. Sensitive to the urgent needs of the Indian people, the architect of India's foreign policy, Jawaharlal Nehru, had deep distrust of the power politics of groups in the international arena "which do not fit in with our environment"[15]. The tense international situation posed a threat to India's crying need of rapid economic development. Hence, in continuation and further development of the Congress approach, India initiated an independent[16]

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12. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (Oxford University Press, 1979), Vol. 2, p. 274; M.S. Rajan (ed.), India's Foreign Relations During the Nehru Era: Some Studies (Asia: 1976), p. xi; K.P.S. Menon, India and the Cold War (Bombay: Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1966), pp.1-2; also, Sen, n. 10.

13. Menon, n. 12, p. 12.

14. J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches: September, 1946 - April, 1961 (Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1961), p. 82.

15. Nehru, n. 2, p. 574.

16. Prasad, n. 37, Ch. I.

foreign policy which only could provide a guarantee for international cooperation for India's economic development, and at the same time, ensure its security.

In his first broadcast on foreign policy, Nehru had declared: "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another" and also that, "We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition of equal opportunities for all races". He sent greetings to, and sought the co-operation of, both the United States and the U.S.S.R., and declared the intention of participating in international conferences "as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation"[17], which nicely defined India's foreign policy.

NON-ALIGNMENT

Within the above-mentioned elemants of Indian foreign policy, a part, nonalignment, has assumed enormous importance, which Nehru termed the "distinguishing mark of India"[18] leading often to the confusion of the part as the whole, from which sometimes even Nehru himself was not immune.[19]

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17. Nehru, n. 14, p. 2; also, J. Nehru, Visit to America, n.4, pp. 9, 29-30.

18. Nehru, n. 14, p. 82.

19. Nehru, n. 14, p. 87; "Our basic policy of nonalignment"; while on another occasion, he declared: "When we say our policy is one of non-alignment, obviously we mean non-alignment with military blocs ... This in itself is not a policy, it is only part of a policy"; while "The policy itself can only be a policy of acting according to our best judgment, and furthering the principal objectives and ideals we have", Ibid., p.79.

In a world sharply divided into two hostile camps, where "Two big colossuses stand face to face with each other, afraid of each other"[20], India had to guard her hard-won independence which consisted, to Nehru, basically of foreign relations: "Once foreign relations go out of hand ... to that extent and in that measure you are not independent"[21]. Hence, devised in the context of the Cold War, India did not join the system of military alliances, and non-alignment came to be considered as 'synonymous with national independence'[22].

India's urgent need of rapid economic development, which necessitated the import of capital and technical know-how, could best be achieved through the non-aligned approach. Way back in 1949, Nehru had declared that "the urgent task before us today is to improve rapidly the economic conditions of our people"[23], and to ensure this India could seek and receive foreign aid from both sides of the Cold War in a very big way as non-alignment constituted one of the basic ingredients of her foreign policy.

Again, on the question of security, non-alignment provided the answer to India. India's geographical location, with close proximity to two giant Socialist states as her northern neighbours,

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20. Asian-African Conference, Bandung, April, 1955, Speeches of the Prime Minister of India in the Closed Session, Government of India, n.d., p. 19.

21. Nehru, n. 1, p. 237.

22. D. Singh, Nehru Legacy: A Symposium (New Delhi: National Book Club, 1966), p. 51.

23. Nehru, n. 17, p. 83.

had been taken into account in considering the non-aligned approach, and this led Nehru to declare that "geographically it would have been quite astonishingly foolish to fall into the business of the Cold War"[24]. On the other hand, non-alignment helped India to ensure her security by procuring arms from both the sides of the Cold War.

Non-alignment helped India to play a greater role in the international arena though in terms of military power she remained weak, which led two scholars to conclude that it was the main source of India's power in the international arena[25], and allowed India to play her desired role in Asia and Africa also.

Moreover, in course of time, non-alignment came to create a strong national consensus[26] in India in support of it, while a policy of alignment would surely have brought in its trail disastrous internal dissensions, apart from serious international dangers.

Hence, non-alignment has been evaluated as 'the only possible rational policy for India'[27] and an official Indian document came to assess the rationale of the same in the achievement that

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24. Nehru, n. 14, p. 83.

25. C.H. Heimsath and S. Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Allied, 1971), p. 61.

26. M.S. Rajan, Non-Alignment: India and the Future (University of Mysore, 1970), pp. 100-101.

27. J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy (Allied, 1970), p. 257.

'it safeguarded national independence and offered the widest measure of opportunities for international cooperation and at the same time contributed towards constructive and peaceful resolution of world problems'.[28]

Originating in the critical years of the Cold War, non-alignment acted as a powerful element in India's independent foreign policy and helped her carry forward the glorious traditions of her national movement by furthering the urgent requirements of economic development with international cooperation while contributing to help improve the international environment in such a way that India won acclaim on both sides of the Cold War. Herein lies its success for the achievement of which, no doubt, Jawaharlal Nehru should be credited in a large way.

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28. Report 1978-79 (Ministry of External Affairs), (New Delhi: Government of India, 1979), p. 1.

CHAPTER XXI

THE KASHMIR PROBLEM AND THE UNITED STATES

BACKGROUND

On the 15th of August, 1947, when India became independent, the 'strategically located state of Kashmir at whose indefinite frontier on the "roof of the world" the territories of India, Afghanistan, the U.S.S.R. and China came together'[1] had not acceded to either the Dominion of India or to that of Pakistan (which it could as it was a princely state in terms of the Indian Independence Act of 1947).

Pakistan, however, soon applied economic pressure on Kashmir, leading ultimately to a tribal invasion on the 22nd of October, 1947,[2] from the North-Western Frontier areas of Pakistan, which compelled Maharaja Hari Singh to sign the Instrument of Accession[3] with the Government of India and which was accepted by the latter on the 27th of October, 1947.[4]

Mountbatten, in his reply to the Maharaja, spoke about "a reference to the people" on the issue of accession[5] once law

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1. J.C. Campbell, The U.S. in World Affairs, 1947-48 (New York: C.F.R. and Harper, 1948), p. 209.
2. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 24.
3. V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Orient Longmans, 1961), pp. 380-81; also A. Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (Bombay: Jaico, 1951), pp. 188-89.
4. Idem.
5. J. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 82.

and order was established and the invaders cleared out of the state, which was subsequently confirmed by Prime Minister Nehru.[6]

Immediately after accession, Indian forces were despatched to Kashmir, who cleared a part of the state of the invaders against heavy odds. However, the constraints of the situation, the most prominent among which was provided by the Pakistani participation in the invasion with British connivance,[7] led the Government of India, under 'Mountbatten's pressure'[8] to refer the question to the U.N. Security Council on the 1st of January, 1948 (under Article 35, Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter).

KASHMIR IN U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

The Government of India requested the U.N. Security Council to "ask the Government of Pakistan:

(1) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, participating in or assisting the invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State;

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6. Independence and After, pp. 59 and 65, n. 1, Ch. 2.

7. L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation, 1947-48 (Orient Longmans, 1969), specially pp. 16, 20-23; Operation Gulmarg was led by Major General Akbar Khan of Pakistan Army, under pseudonym, General Jebal Tariq, with Headquarters in the same building occupied by General Sir Frank Messervey, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army; Lt. General Sen, D.S.O., and author, had led the Indian Army in the Kashmir operations as the Acting Brigadier; Major Brown, British Commaner of the Gilgit Scouts in the strategic Gilgit Agency, had switched over allegiance to Pakistan; Russel B. Haight, an American officer, also worked with the so-called Azad Kashmir forces, The Hindu, February 14, 1950; also see V. Kumar, Anglo-American Plot Against Kashmir (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1954), pp. 2-3.

8. Burke, n. 2.

(2) to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir State;

(3) to deny to the invaders: (a) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir; (b) military and other supplies; (c) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle";

and Nehru noted that the reference was "thus limited to the matters mentioned above".[9]

The Security Council heard the Indian charges against Pakistan, and also the latter's reply, and in a resolution on January 17, 1948, asked both the parties not to do anything which could aggravate the situation and on January 20, 1948, constituted the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to conduct mediation between the parties.[10]

As the Security Council went through these long-drawn procedures, the Indian delegate accused the Council of "fiddling while Kashmir burns"[11]; while Nehru commented: "Instead of

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9. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. I (Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1949), p.171; see also P.F.Power, Gandhi on World Affairs (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), p.81, for M.K. Gandhi's advice against taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations.

10. The Soviet delegate, A Gromyko, wanted a Commission consisting of all the members of the Council, on the apprehension that, otherwise, the Commission might start playing an independent role, and on the non-acceptance of his request, abstained along with Ukraine, see U.N. Doc.S/654 and S/PV 209, 230.

11. The U.S. in World Affairs, 1947-48, n.1, p. 212.

discussing and deciding our reference in a straightforward manner ... that great body got lost in power politics"[12], and later on March 5, 1948, expressed his shock over the fact that India's reference had "not even been properly considered" till then, while "other matters have been given precedence"[13].

Another Security Council Resolution (April 21, 1948), which authorized the U.N. Secretary-General to appoint the Plebiscite Administrator, and to restrict the size of the Indian forces in Kashmir to the minimum, drew a sharp retort from Nehru as having been totally wrong and irrelevant[14], while the New Statesman and Nation (April 24, 1948) commented that India had "cause to complain that the Great Powers ... favour Pakistan for their own reasons". Nehru also protested against attempts to enlarge the scope of the UNCIP's activities[15].

When the UNCIP reached Karachi on July 7, 1948, the next day Pakistan informed them that she had despatched her forces into Kashmir on May 8, 1948, to prevent the advance of the Indian forces beyond the Uri-Poonch-Naushera line[16].

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12. The Hindu, February 16, 1948.

13. S.L. Poplai (ed.), Select Documents on Asian Affairs: India, 1947-50, Vol. II (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 438.

14. S. Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Asia, 1966), p. 171, n. 72.

15. S. Gupta, Ibid., p. 172.

16. K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.), Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question (Karachi: P.I.I.A., 1966), pp. 174-76. This action was undertaken on the recommendations of General Douglas E. Gracey, C-in-C, Pakistan Army, dated April 20, 1949.

Hence, the UNCIP in its Report (S/1100) noted a material change in the situation because of the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir and adopted a Resolution (S/995, August 13,1948), Part I of which called for a ceasefire, while Part II proposed the withdrawal of Pakistani forces and tribesmen, after which India also would withdraw the major portion of its forces, while Part III spoke about Plebiscite. While India accepted it, Pakistan objected to it on the ground that it lacked details for the Plebiscite.[17] The UNCIP arranged for a ceasefire from January 1,1949, and on January 5, 1949, in another supplementary resolution, provided for the details of the Plebiscite including the provision for an Administrator of the same in which post Chester W. Nimitz was selected (March 22, 1949),[18] to which, however, Nehru objected and wanted somebody from a small power.[19]

The UNCIP, however, wanted compulsory arbitration by Admiral Nimitz over differences regarding the implementation of the Part II of the 13 August, 1948 resolution, which was accepted by Pakistan but rejected by, and roundly condemned in India.[20]

The U.S. President Harry S. Truman, and the British Premier

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17. Korbel, n. 5, p. 144.

18. Fleet Admiral Nimitz was C-in-C of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the Second World War.

19. Asian Recorder, 1957, p. 1792. Korbel commends Nimitz as the best choice, see op. cit., p. 156.

20. S. Gupta, pp. 197-99, n.14; The new UNCIP Chairman,Dr.O.Chyle, in a minority report, warned against such arbitration as attempted intervention on the part of the U.S.A. and U.K. and wanted the UNCIP to be saved from becoming a tool in the hands of some great powers which, to Korbel, lay at the root of the replacement of the UNCIP itself, Korbel, op. cit., p. 160.

C. Attlee, appealed to the parties to accept it, to which Nehru reacted as an intervention which neglected the fundamental issues involved[21], which, however, to the United States, appeared to be only a 'Pressure for peaceful settlement'[22] to solve the 'immediate status of Kashmir' which was leading to a 'great breach in South Asia's mountain defenses'[23], while the subsequent General McNaughton's proposals, which India rejected, created an 'impression of Indian intransigence'[24] in the United States, and Dean Acheson, the then Secretary of State, concluded that 'both Nehru's ideas and procedure ... and his notions of the dispute itself made any possibility of settlement dim indeed'[25].

Regarding the Security Council Resolution (March 30, 1951) which imposed restraints upon the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, and also proposed arbitration again, Nehru bitterly resented U.S. - U.K. role as having been guided by "considerations which were extraneous to the problem"[26] and characterized the United Nations mediation efforts through F.P. Graham as "extremely unfriendly, illogical, and betrayed a great deal of ignorance of

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21. J.C. Campbell, The U.S. in World Affairs, 1948-1949 (New York: CFR and Harper, 1949), p. 417.

22. Ibid., p. 416.

23. Ibid., p. 414.

24. Ibid., pp. 417-18.

25. D. Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p.336; for Acheson's views on Kashmir, and also pp.334-36 for a very contemptuous view of Nehru.

26. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches: 1949-1953 (Delhi: Publications Division, 1954), p. 333, also pp. 202-206 and 334-35.

the basic issues"[27], and by March, 1953, the Graham Mission also ended in a failure.

Meanwhile, in the course of the Security Council debate on the issue, on January 17, 1952, the Soviet delegate Jacob Malik had severely attacked Anglo-U.S. interference in Kashmir, charging them with the ulterior motive of inducting their troops there so as to turn the area into an imperialist war base.[28]

In the above circumstances, the Anglo-U.S. resolution of November, 1952, which was "wholly opposed" to India's "basic position on fundamental issues"[29] and which aimed at reducing the number of Indian troops in Kashmir had only heightened India's suspicions.

In pursuance of Graham's recommendation of initiating bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan, the same was started between the two Prime Ministers, in which "strenuous efforts were made, at all levels to settle all outstanding disputes"[30], which constituted a "diplomacy of direct contact"[31]

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27. R.P. Stebbins (ed.), The U.S. in World Affairs, 1951 (C.F.R. and Harper, 1952), pp. 254-55; also see therein, U.S. officials' favourable impression of Pakistan.

28. Security Council, Official Records, 570th Meeting, January 17, 1952.

29. Report, 1952-53, Government of India (New Delhi: The Ministry of External Affairs), p. 7.

30. Report, 1953-54, Government of India (New Delhi: The Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.), p. 8.

31. Ibid., p. 9.

including two conferences between the two Premiers, unfortunately, however, only the prospects to be vitiated by the "intervention of a third party"[32] in the form of U.S. military aid to Pakistan.

U.S. MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

Background

While India and Pakistan achieved independence in the midst of the Cold War,[33] the aim of India's foreign policy was to steer clear of any alignment with the two sides of the same and also to seek cooperation from both sides in India's economic development.

The central problem of U.S. foreign policy was, both in 1947 and in 1948, "How to deal with Russia" with which the U.S. was engaged in a competition 'for power and influence' in order to ensure which 'For strategic reasons the United States was not willing to permit the "rimlands" of the Eurasian continent (Western and Southern Europe, Turkey, Iran, India and the China Coast) to fall into the hands of a power which controlled the "heartland".[34] In this approach, the military factor 'loomed ... large' and moved through the process of the 'erection of strategic barriers against Soviet expansion'.[35]

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32. Ibid., pp. 8 and 11.

33. Supra, Ch. 2.

34. Campbell, n. 1, pp. 2-3.

35. R.P. Stebbins (ed.), The U.S. in World Affairs, 1949 (C.F.R. and Harper, 1950), p. 25.

The Soviet attainment of nuclear weapons in 1949, and the even more powerful explosion, in the form of the rise of Communist power in China, accentuated the urgency of U.S. global strategy of containment in which the United States had hoped for using India as a "counterweight to China".[36]

DISILLUSIONMENT WITH INDIA

However, as it became clear that India was determined to stick to its approach of non-alignment, which found expression through the difficult years of the Korean War, and also its recognition of the People's Republic of China and its advocacy of Chinese representation in the United Nations, the United States deeply disillusioned, assessed Indian foreign policy as being "real politik garbed in the robes of a complacent piety"[37] while The New York Times (August 28, 1951) declared that Nehru was "fast becoming one of the great disappointments of the post-war era ... Nehru's attention was primarily turned on a local, national and intensely personal equation - Kashmir", while earlier an American journalist had aptly apprehended that the United States might 'start casting about desperately in South Asia in search of anti-Communist allies ... for stooges that it can prop up'.[38]

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36. The New York Times, cited in Burke, n.2, p.120; V.M. Dean, "Should the U.S. Reexamine its Foreign Policy?", Foreign Policy Reports, December 15, 1949, pp. 186-87.

37. The New York Post, March 4, 1951; comment by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

38. H.R. Isaccs, in P. Talbot (ed.), South Asia in World Today (University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 223.

PAKISTAN'S POLICY

Since Independence, however, 'Pakistan's first concern was the establishment of security - against India'.[39] Initially, the Pakistani leadership lamented the Western neglect of Pakistan in spite of its 'important strategic location',[40] which was somewhat corrected by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the United States in May, 1950, which assisted 'America to discover Pakistan',[41] in the course of which he had secret talks with the Defence Secretary Louis Johnson, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[42]

Unlike India, Pakistan used the Korean War to cultivate relations with the United States, as a result of which, gradually, 'by 1951 circumstances were already pushing both Pakistan and the United States towards an alliance which they formally consummated in 1954'.[43]

Meanwhile, in November, 1952, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, U.S. C-in-C in the Pacific region, toured Pakistan and confirmed its strategic importance,[44] followed by a Special Study Mission of

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39. Foreign Policy Reports, June 15, 1949, p. 86.

40. K. Sarwar Hasan, Strategic Interests of Pakistan (Karachi: P.I.I.A., 1954), pp. 2-4, for Pakistan's fear of India, and U.S. military assistance as the way out.

41. Burke, n.2, p. 123.

42. Dawn, May 21, 1950.

43. Burke, n. 2, p. 135.

44. Dawn, November 10, 1952.

the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which also expressed similar views after which the new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles undertook an Asian trip including South Asia, and on return, spoke highly about the "strong spiritual faith and martial spirit" of the Pakistani people.[45]

A Pakistani official delegation, which included the Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad, Foreign Minister, Zafrulla Khan, and the C-in-C, Pakistan Army, General Ayub Khan, visited the United States in October-November, 1953, closely followed by a tour by the U.S. Vice-President R. Nixon to Pakistan and India, who strongly advocated arms aid to Pakistan to counter India's non-alignment.[46][47]

Pakistan entered into an Agreement with Turkey on this count (April 4, 1954),[48] followed by the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States (May 19, 1954)[49] and joined the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (September 8, 1954)[50] and also signed the Baghdad Pact on September 23, 1955, which left immense impact on international affairs in this region of the world.

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45. The New York Times, June 2, 1953.

46. Ibid., November 13, 1953; for report that talks on arms aid had been going on for about two years.

47. The U.S. News and World Report, January 4, 1954.

48. P.V. Curl (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (C.F.R. and Harper, 1955), pp. 376-78, for text.

49. Ibid., pp. 379-383.

50. Ibid., pp. 319-323.

IMPACT OF U.S.-PAK MILITARY ALLIANCE

To India, the U.S. arms aid as well as the Pact with Pakistan was a threat to peace and which brought the Cold War nearer and "if a hot shooting war developed it also comes right upto the borders of India" and she reminded Pakistan that its acceptance of military aid from the United States would change the whole context of Indo-Pak negotiations, including Kashmir,[51] and assessed that it would encourage the "Pakistan authorities in their aggressiveness" and would increase tension and conflict between India and Pakistan"[52] and also that the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts "tend to encircle us".[53]

With reference to President Eisenhower's assurance to India against any use of U.S. arms by Pakistan, Nehru bitterly told the Parliament (March 1, 1954): "Aggression took place in Kashmir six and a half years ago ... the United States have not thus far condemned it ... Aggression may take place again and be denied ... Later longer arguments will be carried on as to whether it was aggression or not. The military aid given by the United States to Pakistan is likely to create conditions which facilitate and encourage aggression".[54]

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51. Reports 1953-54: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, pp. 44-46.

52. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. III (Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1958), p. 476.

53. Ibid., p. 319.

54. Excerpts from Prime Minister Nehru's Speeches: Kashmir, 1947-1956 (New Delhi: Information Service of India, 1956), pp. 37-39; also Curl, n. 48, pp. 373-76, for Presidential statement and correspondence with Nehru on the issue.

The Indo-Pakistan negotiations, in this situation, became deadlocked, and India also demanded the withdrawal of American servicemen from the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan as they could no longer be treated as neutral, and were considered "indiscreet, if not legally culpable".[55][56]

Pakistan sought U.S. military aid and also diplomatic support with an eye to bolstering its strength vis-a-vis India, and had very little to do with Communism.[57] As Arnold Wolfers most appropriately observed, "Pakistanis are more inclined to turn their guns in the direction of Eastern Kashmir than toward the Khyber Pass'[58], while Henry Kissinger had noted in 1956 that, 'Pakistan desires arms more for their effect on India than for the protection they afford against USSR or China'.[59] Hence, an Indian scholar has assessed the U.S. efforts as the 'containment of India through the military build-up of Pakistan'.[60]

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55. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. II (Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 183.

56. The Statesman, March 18, 1954.

57. A. Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947-1966 (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1966), p. 85; R.E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968), p. 87; S. Lutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta: Minerva, 1977), pp. 228-29.

58. A. Wolfers, Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1959), p. 11.

59. H. Kissinger, in H.F. Armstrong (ed.), Fifty Years of Foreign Affairs (New York: C.F.R. and Praeger, 1972), p. 268.

60. B.R. Nayar, American Geopolitics and India (New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1976), p. 108.

U.S. arms aid to Pakistan also constituted a severe drainage of Indian resources by way of enforcing increased defence expenditures[61] creating sort of a 'modest armaments race in the sub-continent, causing a rise of the Indian defense budget from $ 410 million to nearly $ 600 million in the four years after 1954.[62]

Regarding the question as to whether the 1954 decision of the United States had actually blocked the Kashmir settlement, Barnds opines that 'Nehru took the occasion to pull back from a politically embarrassing commitment'.[63] As regards the U.S. motives behind the alliance, Indian scholars Venkataramani and Arya point out that the United States was mainly guided by the potentialities of Pakistan as a base for air operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc',[64] while Barnds estimates that the United States derived benefits mainly in the form of military intelligence facilities provided for by the U.S. bases in Pakistan.[65]

However, one cannot but notice that the U.S. decision at least had heightened tensions between India and Pakistan and did not help any more towards betterment of relations between them.

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61. Wolfers, n. 58, p. 204.

62. W.J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (C.F.R. and Praeger, 1972), p. 253. Barnds worked with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's Office of National Estimates(1952-1966).

63. Ibid., p. 250.

64. M.S. Venkataramani and H.C. Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partership", International Studies (July-October, 1966), p. 85.

65. Barnds, n. 62, p. 252.

KASHMIR IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AGAIN

As direct negotiations between India and Pakistan became deadlocked, on the initiative of Pakistan, the Security Council took up the question again, in the course of which on February 14, 1957 (U.N. Document, S/3787), a resolution sponsored by four powers including the United States was vetoed by the Soviet Union as it had sought to introduce U.N. forces in Kashmir, which Nehru bitterly called "collective aggression or collective approval of aggression"[66], while the Pakistan President Major General Iskander Mirza, in a telegram to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, expressed "the appreciation of the people of Pakistan for the support of the U.S. Government for the Kashmir resolution in the U.N."[67].

Outside the United Nations also, Pakistan felt further reassured when the United States negotiated and signed a new bilateral Security Agreement with her after 1958[68], while in 1961, after the visit of President Mohammad Ayub Khan to the United States, the joint communique referred to the further extension of military assistance, as well as to the Kashmir problem[69], which created resentment in India.

Subsequently, however, India rejected President Kennedy's mediation proposal on the issue as it implied "a third nation

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66. Asian Recorder, 1957, Vol. III, No. 9, p. 1327.

67. Ibid., p. 1288; also Barnds, n. 62, p. 127.

68. Barnds, ibid.

69. Asian Recorder, 1961, Vol. VII, no. 35, pp. 4134-35.

sitting in judgment over the issue of sovereignty"[70]. As Pakistan threatened fresh tribal invasion, the Government of India attributed it to U.S. military aid and appealed to the United States to restrain Pakistan.[71]

In the U.N. Security Council again, an Irish resolution (S/5134 of June 22, 1962) was vetoed by the USSR, and Nehru considered it a "misfortune that two great powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, should almost invariably be against us". He noted that though Pakistan had not vacated aggression and defied the Security Council resolution for fourteen years, "the U.S., in addition to this fact, or, may be as a consequence of it, gives military aid to Pakistan"[72], which speaks constantly in terms of war.

CONCLUSION

The Kashmir problem originated out of the 'unfinished business arising from partition'[73]. The strategic location of Kashmir and the atmosphere of Cold War attracted the interested great powers, specially, the Western bloc, which utilized the issue to further their global designs in the region.

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70. Ibid., 1962, p. 4452.

71. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. IV (Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1964), pp. 298-99.

72. Ibid., p. 300; also Asian Recorder, 1962, p. 4792, for the Ceylonese delegate G.P. Malalasekera's secret report, that because of Pentagon pressure the U.S. Administration had tried to persuade small powers to sponsor the resolution, which it ultimately achieved through Ireland.

73. A. Lamb, n. 57, p. 12.

While India went to the United Nations Organization for quick and just redress of its grievances, in the process, it actually jumped from the Kashmir frying pan into the fire of the Cold War.

The United States soon sidetracked the initial Indian complaint and extended its approach to other problems, conveniently forgetting the genesis of the conflict, and very soon, India found herself shifted from the complainants to the defendant's box'.[74]

To India, Kashmir constituted a part of her vital interests involving questions of security as well as the very basis of its secular polity which, the United States as well as the West simply overlooked and considered it like just an ordinary geographical unit.[75] While India considered herself, morally and legally, on unassailable grounds on the issue,[76] to Admiral Nimitz, it was simply a 'dispute over the ownership of the Princely State of Kashmir',[77] which clearly reveals the yawning gap between these two views.

The United States started with diplomatic support to Pakistan[78] after her disillusionment with India, which, in course of time,

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74. J.C. Kumdra, India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1954 (Djakarta: J.B. Wolters-Groningen, 1955), p. 103.

75. Nehru, n. 9, p. 343.

76. Ibid., p. 184.

77. Korbel, n. 5, p. vii, in Foreword by Nimitz, which also confirms the soundness of Nehru's objection against Nimitz.

78. W.A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China (New York: Walker, 1964), p. 44.

came to be fortified by military aid of immense importance, both in terms of quantity and quality, and which was aimed at counter-balancing a non-aligned India more than Communism. In spite of significant opposition from influential sections of opinion in the United States, the Administration clearly moved along its strategic interests in the region as it perceived them, without caring for the serious consequences it was to lead to in the South Asian subcontinent, and the complications it was bound to create in its relations with India, for years to come.

No doubt, Indian diplomatic weaknesses also had contributed to the impasse over Kashmir. While she accused Pakistan of aggression, the complaint with the U.N. Security Council was mysteriously filed under Ch. VI of the U.N. Charter, while it could and should have been filed under Ch. VII of the same, wherein a clear dichotomy is discernible. Again, on the UNCIP's minority report also, she did not even demand a discussion of the same though it contained some points which would have been crucial for her case, both of which, it appears, may be attributed to some fond illusions of the early years of India's foreign policy.[79]

As the United States and Indian policies gradually drifted apart during the heydays of the Cold War, the Kashmir issue also came to suffer from its vicious influence. Had India pressed its military campaign in the first Kashmir struggle to its logical

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79. A proper assessment, it appears, can be undertaken only when the relevant official papers are published.

conclusion, clearing out the invaders, it seems, that much of the trouble, which plagued the unfortunate subcontinent later on, might have been avoided, more so, as the United States had not, at that time, become toughly committed to the cause of Pakistan.

The United States through its constant harping on the Pakistani tune over Kashmir and through its policy of allying itself militarily with Pakistan, created a very hostile image of herself in India, which predetermined the future course of relationship between these two states for years to come.

The issue, however, brought home to India, some very deserving lessons in international affairs. As Prime Minister Nehru had admitted before the Parliament:

"It has been an amazing education for many of us ...education in world politics, education in how nations can behave, education in how great countries get distorted visions and cannot see straight in the simplest manner when it so suits them"[80].

As the future was to prove, these were, indeed, very difficult, costly, and unfortunate lessons for India.

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80. Nehru, n. 9, p. 345; speech in the Parliament on August 2,1952.

CHAPTER IV

THE SUEZ CRISIS, HUNGARY AND INDIA-U.S. RELATIONS

The Suez Canal, the 'vital link between Western Europe and the Middle Eastern oil fields'[1], though situated within Egypt, was managed by the Anglo-French Universal Company of the Maritime Canal of Suez (UCMCS).

Egypt had become independent from Britain in 1946, after which, in 1952, the country went under the control of a militant regime under whose pressure the British had to withdraw their military presence from the area.

The Government of Egypt, under the leadership of President of U.A.R. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, had been assured of economic aid from the United States and the United Kingdom for the construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile which was of great economic importance to Egypt. However, as Egypt sought and accepted military aid from the Socialist bloc, which 'hit Dulles ... like a thunderbolt'[2], the United States, on July 19, 1951, abruptly announced withdrawal of the promised aid to which Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the UCMCS (July 26, 1956) with a view to financing the construction of the Aswan Dam out of its revenues[3], which led

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1. Pratt, A History of U.S. Foreign Policy, Ch.I,n.23, p. 519.

2. H. Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy (London: Heinemann, 1964), p. 28.

3. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Ch.II, n. 14, p. 530; The U.S. decision initiated the crisis by hurting Egypt's "self-respect".

to sharp reaction in the Western countries.[4]

After a conference in London (August 1-2, 1956), the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France announced the Egyptian measure to be a threat to the freedom and security of the Canal and proposed a Conference of Canal Users, which was held in London on August 16-23, 1956 and attended by twenty-two nations.

The London Conference, however, rejected an Indian proposal backed by Ceylon, Indonesia and the Soviet Union and adopted the Dulles Plan which wanted international control of the Canal which was rejected by Egypt.[5] India wanted the settlement of the crisis, "on the basis of the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt ... and the abandonment of postures of threats and violence and of unilateral action by either party".[6] At the London Conference, India assessed the difference between its proposals and the U.S. proposal to be one of fundamental quality, and the Indian delegate, V.K. Krishna Menon, commented that "What is proposed in the U.S. scheme is that, in effect, Egypt would have the sovereign rights of ownership but not the sovereign power to exercise them!"[7] The Indian delegate

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4. Finer, Supra, pp. 63-64, for British reaction; p. 66, for Dulles' "matter of great concern" to the U.S.; and p. 99, for Soviet support to Egyptian action; also, Asian Recorder, Vol.I, 1956, pp. 963-65.

5. For initial Indian reaction, see Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Supra, pp. 527-32.

6. Ibid., p. 531.

7. Information Service of India, Suez Canal Crisis and India (New Delhi: no date), p. 23; see also, p. 30.

appealed to the London Conference "to adopt the path of conciliation[8], and not the path of dictation", while Nehru, in a speech in the Lok Sabha (September 13, 1956), pleaded for a negotiated settlement, appealed to the United States and the United Kingdom, and regretted the course of action contemplated by them, including France.[9]

THE INTERVENTION

Unfortunately, however, true to India's apprehensions, on October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt, on which plea Britain and France delivered a 12-hour ultimatum to the belligerents which was rejected by Egypt, and on October 31, 1956, the Anglo-French forces struck in Egypt in order to "guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal by ships of all nations"[10], which drew sharp Indian denouncement of "unabashed aggression and deception"[11]. All the Indian political parties 'condemned the aggresion on Egypt in the strongest terms possible'[12].

THE SUEZ CRISIS AND THE U.N.O.

The U.S. initiative in the Security Council, with its draft resolution, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces,

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8. Ibid., p. 26.

9. Nehru, n. 3, pp. 532-34.

10. A. Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 527.

11. Nehru, n. 3, p. 536.

12. M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56 (I.C.W.A., Asia, 1964), p. 164.

was vetoed by the United Kingdom and France,[13] while a Soviet resolution also met with the same fate.

On the basis of a resolution put forward by Yugoslavia, an Emergency Special Session was convened on November 1, 1956, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, wherein the U.S.-U.S.S.R. sponsored a joint resolution urging immediate cessation of hostilities,[14] which was accepted, and to which, India extended support, while remaining alert against any delaying tactics. On November 3, 1956, India lent support to a Canadian resolution on the creation of an U.N. Emergency Force for the implementation of the ceasefire, carefully blocking any move for turning the interventionist forces into U.N. forces, while an Indian resolution which put pressure on the interventionists was also passed.[15]

On November 5, 1956, the Soviet Premier Bulganin, in a message to the Security Council, demanded withdrawal of the interventionist forces from Egypt within three days, failing which, he proposed U.N., specially, U.S.- U.S.S.R. joint help with all their forces to Egypt, along with which, he sent messages to the United Kingdom, France, Israel and the United States on the proposed course of action,[16] which created serious apprehensions about a wider

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13. U.N.S.C.O.R., Eleventh Year, 749th and 750th Meetings, October 30 and 31, 1956.

14. U.N.G.A.O.R., First Emergency Session (Special), 562nd Meeting, November 1, 1956; for text, G.A. 563rd Meeting (Plenary), November 2, 1956, U.N. Doc. A/4356, A/Res./390.

15. N. Lal, From Collective Security to Peace-Keeping: A Study of India's Contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force 1956-67 (Calcutta, Minerva, 1975), pp. 131-133.

16. Finer, n. 2, pp. 417-19.

conflagration.

Britain and France, however, subsequently ordered ceasefire from the midnight of November 6, 1956, and withdrew their forces by December 22, 1956, while the Israeli forces followed by March 8, 1957.

INDIA AND THE CRISIS

India was vitally interested in the Suez Canal through which about seventy-six per cent of its imports and seventy- per cent of its exports were carried on.[17] Moreover, India was on quite friendly terms with Egypt,[18] which was the most important country in the Middle East and which was also a leading Banduing power, while with Britain and France too she had good and close relations.[19]

Before the intervention, India had urged moderation on both sides,[20] while at the same time, standing firmly against any attempt to curb Egyptian sovereignty. While India's urge for moderation had its desired effect on Egypt, it failed to carry weight with the Western bloc, more so, as initially, Dulles also

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17. The Suez Canal Crisis, n. 7, p. 7.

18. Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents, 1947-64 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966), pp. 12-14; for text, the India-Egypt Treaty of Friendship, issued in Cairo (April 6, 1955). Henceforth, India: Documents.

19. The Suez Canal Crisis, n. 7, p. 5.

20. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. II (Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 278-79; S. Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office, Ch. III, n. 57, p. 160.

was seriously against any flexible attitude.[21] Hence, the contradictory positions of India and the United States as well as the Western bloc at the London Conference.

However, India was also opposed to the Western plans to depose Nasser,[22] who, because of his crucial role in international affairs in the Middle East, and because of his opposition to the Baghdad Pact,[23] had become an eyesore with the Western bloc.

The U.S. role, however, gradually changed over in a positive direction, which helped contain the conflict. The Presidential statement of August 31, 1956, on the U.S. commitment to a peaceful solution of the issue upto Dulles' statement just before the attack on Egypt urging against the use of force in the Suez crisis,[24] acted in favour of the forces of peace. While the outbreak of the conflict infuriated the U.S. Secretary of State,[25] the U.S. President also,[26] correctly assessing the danger of a general war in view of

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21. D.D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (London: Heinemann, 1965), pp. 669-671, for U.S. policy with respect to Nasser, which also includes President Eisenhower's letter to the British Premier of September 8, 1956, wherein the President wanted to isolate Nasser without bloodshed, and achieve more than the invasion, and permanently.

22. Nehru, n. 3, p. 535, for Lok Sabha statement of November 16, 1956; V.L. Pandit, The Scope of Happiness: A Personal Memoir (Vikas, 1979), p. 295, that Dulles seemed to concur in wishing the end of Nasser'; Finer, n.2, p. 330 also.

23. M. Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.65-66, for Eden's view of Nasser being a Fascist.

24. Department of State Bulletin, November 5, 1956, p. 695 ff.

25. Finer, n.2, pp. 371-72.

26. Ibid., p. 411.

the angry Soviet reaction, moved in a way ultimately convergent with the Indian approach to the solution of the crisis. The U.S. pressure on the aggressors was correctly appreciated by Nehru.[27] As V.K. Krishna Menon mused later, had the United States "played the role that she had to play and did play afterwards", agreement in the London Conference could have been achieved.[28][29]

India successfully sought and achieved the twin aims of quickly ending the conflict so as to prevent any further escalation of the same, while at the same time protecting its friend, the United Arab Republic, thereby fulfilling the aim of facing the world with a common stand.[30]

HUNGARY, 1956 : BACKGROUND

Another contemporary crisis drew the attention of the world in a large manner. On October 22-23, 1956, the Hungarians rose into 'mass demonstration' and 'serious rioting' in Budapest, demanding liberalization, amidst which, Imre Nagy became the Premier, and sought the help of Soviet troops (stationed under the Warsaw Pact arrangements) to restore order. On the 28th October, however, with the intensification of the movement, Nagy demanded their withdrawal which started on the same date, while the Soviet[31]

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27. Ibid., pp. 359-60, 368, 374-75.

28. Nehru Visits U.S.A. (Washington: Information Service of India, no date), p. 20.

29. Brecher, n. 23, p. 64.

30. India: Documents, n. 18, p. 14.

31. Rajan, n. 12, p. 168.

Union, on October 30, made a general policy declaration clarifying their position with respect to the consideration and beginning of their forces' withdrawal from Budapest. On the 31st October, the Hungarian Government announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact itself, and sought from the United Nations for a neutral status. However, on November 2, Nagy protested against Soviet troop movements into Hungary. On November 4, amidst serious disturbances, Soviet troops moved in, Nagy was ousted from power and sought world help, while his colleague, Janos Kadar became the new Premier, suppressed the movement and on the 11th of November announced certain reforms.

INDIAN POLICY

While the Western media gave the Hungarian crisis very wide coverage, Nehru, in his first press comment[32] (which was a cautious one) on October 25, 1956, assessed it as a nationalist upsurge which affected the Hungarians internal independence[33] while later, on November 5, 1956, in his inaugural speech to the UNESCO Conference, he spoke about "both human dignity and freedom outraged and the force of modern arms used to suppress people" in both Egypt and in Hungary.[34] In a statement to the Lok Sabha (November 16, 1956), Nehru clarified: "From the very beginning we made it clear that ... the people of Hungary should be allowed

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32. Dutt, n. 20, p. 174.

33. The Hindu, October 26, 1956.

34. Nehru, n. 3, p. 171.

to determine their future according to their own wishes and that foreign forces should be withdrawn"[35], and on the same day, India, through its Ambassador in Moscow, conveyed its views to the Soviet Union[36], while in his address to the All-India Congress Committee, Nehru referred to the Soviet version of the Hungarian issue as a partial account.[37]

The UNITED NATIONS AND HUNGARY

On November 4, 1956, the United States moved a resolution in the U.N. Security Council, calling upon the USSR to withdraw immediately from Hungary, and stop sending forces there, which was vetoed by the latter, upon which, the United States moved for an emergency special session of the General Assembly on the issue.[38]

When the U.N. General Assembly, on November 4, 1956, adopted the United States sponsored resolution, the Indian delegation led by A. Lall, along with fourteen other Afro-Asian countries abstained.[39]

Later, on November 9, 1956, India voted against a resolution in the Special General Assembly Session along with the Soviet

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35. Ibid., pp.555-56;Nehru also announced relief for Hungary.

36. K.P.S. Menon, The Flying Troika (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 171.

37. The Hindustan Times, November 10, 1956.

38. U.N.S.C.O.R., Eleventh Year, 752nd Meeting, November 2, 1956, U.N. Document S/PV 752.

39. Verbatim Record, 564th Meeting, U.N.G.A., November 4, 1956.

bloc which called for elections in Hungary under the supervision of the United Nations as she felt that it was "contrary to the Charter"; "improperly worded"; and would "reduce Hungary to a less than sovereign state"; and established "a bad precedent".[40]

CONCLUSION

India's policy with respect to Hungary came under fire from within, spearheaded by eminent persons like Jayaprakash Narayan, as well as from the Western world, which accused her of double standards,[41] and 'tardy' reaction.[42] India was criticised for having failed to treat Hungary on a par with Suez,[43] while some criticism was directed particularly to the Indian stand on the November 9, 1956 resolution, which was termed as 'reprehensible'.[44]

The alleged tardiness in Indian reaction has been attributed to the fact of a breakdown of communication between New Delhi and the Indian Mission in Hungary manned by a junior diplomat, who could establish contact with India only in the first week of

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40. Nehru, n. 3, p. 556; India abstained on parts of the resolution and voted against only one paragraph, the voting itself having been recorded paragraph by paragraph; Dutt, n. 20, pp.180-83, on this resolution; and for information that Nehru instructed Krishna Menon not to vote against any other resolution without specific instructions.

41. D.N. Mallik, The Development of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy (Allahabad: Chaitanya, 1967), p. 181.

42. R.N. Berkes and M.S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations (Standford University Press, 1958), p. 48; also The New York Times, November 20,1956.

43. C.H. Heimsath and S. Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Allies, 1971), p. 427, 'delicate balancing feat'.

44. Barnds, n. 62, Ch.III, p. 122.

November, and as the Indian Government was aware of the partisan role of the Western media part of which was responsible for fomenting some troubles in Hungary, the Government of India had ample reasons to be cautious.[45]

As for questions of parity, the Suez invasion definitely moved Afro-Asians more.[46] In India also, it created angry reactions, and revived "bitter memories of the past".[47] As the facts were clear, no question of Cold War was involved, and as both the United States as well as the U.S.S.R. stood against it, added to Indian economic and political stakes involved, her stand on the Suez crisis could not have been otherwise.

No doubt, in comparison with Suez, both physically as well as psychologically, to India, Hungary was a distant affair. Moreover, conscious as India was of the role of the Cold War involved in this question,[48] and the danger of its escalation into a hot war, India's efforts were aimed at reducing such a possibility, while trying to protect the aspirations of the Hungarian people. Hence, total identification with the West was out of the question, and Nehru aptly explained the two approaches in an exchange with an American correspondent:

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45. Dutt, n. 20, pp. 174-75.

46. Barnds, n. 62, Ch. III, p. 122.

47. Nehru, n. 3, p. 172.

48. Brecher, n. 23, pp. 84-86.

"India attempted to put forward a constructive approach ... otherwise people sit apart and condemn each other and nothing is done ... It is a question of the context and wording and how you end up".[49]

About the particular negative vote, India, it appears, was guided by the desire to prevent the United Nations from becoming again a forum of the Cold War, but more so with an eye to preventing any precedent for any future intervention in Kashmir. Use of 'language inimical to conciliation'[50] lay at the root, at least partially, behind abstentions.

These two major issues of 1956, created a certain degree of 'ideological confusion'[51] in the mind of the Indian people leaving behind some lasting impact. To Nehru, in these two cases, both sides were guilty of "grievous transgression of the moral standards freely accepted by the nations of the world".[52]

While the Hungarian crisis led to a loss of Soviet prestige in India,[53] diplomatic efforts on the part of the United States and

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49. The New York Times, December 20, 1956.

50. Heimsath and Mansingh, n. 43, pp. 429-430.

51. Rajan, n. 12, pp. 147-48 and 180-82.

52. W. Range, Jawaharlal Nehru's World View: A Theory of International Relations (University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1961), p. 15.

53. Barnds, n. 62, Ch.III, p.123; S.J.R. Bilgrami, India's Role in the U.N.: With Special Reference to Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories (New Delhi: Jamia Millia, 1969), p. 7; W.N. Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 3rd edn. (Harvard University Press, 1972), p.385.

India to diffuse the Suez crisis brought them closer together.[54] Actually, these two crises led to an improvement in the relations between the United States and India.

54. K. Gupta, India in World Politics: A Period of Transition (Calcutta: Scientific, 1969), p. 2.

CHAPTER V

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONFLICT (1962) AND INDIA-U.S. RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The Sino-Indian Border Conflict (October 20 - November 21, 1962) was a traumatic experience for India. As the military conflict dragged on, to the utter discomfiture of the Indian forces, Nehru admitted: "We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation"[1]. The Border Conflict itself was a multi-causal phenomenon[2], which left tremendous impact on the Indian political system both in its internal and its external facets and contained the seeds of some significant future developments in the South Asian region. The United States became a very active actor in international interaction in this area and henceforth the internal and the international aspects came to be very sensitively interconnected in the Indian political system which was also very much brought down to earth, painfully conscious of the fact that it stood on feet of clay. This also raised fundamental questions regarding India's foreign policy.

THE INTERNAL FALL-OUT

The 'debacle of 1962'[3] brought in its trail the first serious

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1. The Statesman (Calcutta), October 26, 1962.
2. J. Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Coexistence (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967); for a survey of Sino-Indian Relations, literature on which is abundant; also International Studies (July-October, 1963) Special Double Issue on "Chinese Aggression and India"; for a comprehensive study of the different facets of the issue.
3. K. Subrahmanyam, "1962: The Causes and Lessons", International Studies, July, 1969, p. 149.

internal political crisis in India since Independence, and strong demands for a reorientation of the foreign policy based on non-alignment[4], as well as demands for changes in government, specially, for the removal of the Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon, were raised.[5]

THE KRISHNA MENON EPISODE

The New York Times (October 30, 1962), in its New Delhi despatch (by A.M. Rosenthal) assessed the political impact of the Chinese attack as having 'wrecked the political future' of Krishna Menon, and expressed satisfaction over the fact that it would 'substantially increase the chances that the next Government of India will be led by moderates and conservatives' and predicted that Menon's resignation was only a question of time.

Subsequently, because of severe criticism of Menon in the country as well as even within the ruling party, Nehru had to[6]

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4. The Indian Express, October 24, 1962, for views of General K.M.Cariappa; The Hindu, October 27, 1962, for Jayaprakash Narayan's attack on the Government of India's "appeasement" policy and M.R. Masani's demand for the ouster of the Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon.

5. The Times (October 23, 1962) spoke about the "wider effects ... on the neutralism" of India, while the Washington Post (October 26, 1962) considered it "interesting to see what happens to Indian relations with Moscow" and observed "it is good that hard questions are being asked for Defense Minister, Krishna Menon, about the feeble nature of Indian defense. Is it possible that the waves of shock may even shake some of the arrogance out of the sanctimonious Mr. Nehru?".

6. However, in July, 1962, General K.S. Thimayya had assessed:"We could never hope to match China in the foreseable future. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security". General K.S. Thimayya, "Adequate Insurance', Seminar, July, 1962, pp. 14-15.

relieve him of all responsibilities on November 8, 1962, though Nehru thought that it was unfair to hold Menon responsible for India's failures — "We are all responsible for it. The fact is, he has been all the time urging us to be more prepared, but for various reasons, chiefly financial and foreign exchange, we did not prepare ourselves"[7]. However, The Nation (December 1, 1962) observed: "The enforced removal of V.K. Krishna Menon ... must have been hailed by most Americans as the best news out of India for years", while the then U.S. Ambassador in India, J.K.Galbraith commented that it 'removes the symbol of anti-Americanism, Menon may not be so important as the change of policy which his departure signifies'[8]. Later on, the new incumbent to the Defence Ministry observed: "It must be said to the credit of Krishna Menon that he planned many useful projects for the armed forces, including the production of aircraft and tank"[9].

PRESSURES TO GIVE UP NON-ALIGNMENT

While the Government of India moved resolutions regarding the Proclamation of Emergency,[10] and on the Chinese Aggresion in

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7. Link, November 4, 1962, in 'The Week'.

8. J.K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 454.

9. T.V. Kunhi Krishnan, Chavan and the Troubled Decade (Delhi: Hind, 1973), pp. 73-74.

10. Issued by the President (October 26, 1962) under Article 352(1) of the Constitution of India.

Parliament on November 8, 1962, demands were raised by a section of the Opposition for reorientation of Indian foreign policy in order to secure massive arms aid from the Western bloc on any terms,[11] while similar opinion prevalent among a section of the ruling party was voiced by K. Hanumanthaiya, who wanted "a brigade from every democratic country on the frontiers of the Himalayas"[12], while the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, in its Tenth Annual Session at Bhopal demanded a "re-evaluation and reorientation of our foreign policy".[13]

Reacting sharply to the tirade against non-alignment and India's foreign policy, the Socialist Congressman (December 1, 1962), in an editorial "Reality of the Anti-Nehrus" specifically referred to the B.B.C. interview with Nehru (November 26, 1962) wherein the interviewer had been "brutally frank" and asked Nehru with reference to Krishna Menon's resignation "If the Prime Minister himself might have to make way" to which the editorial asserted that in any case, Nehru would remain the leader, and advised Congress anti-Nehrus to join the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh parties.

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11. Lok Sabha Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 9, Cols. 106-108 (November 8-20, 1962) for official resolution, and Cols.133-142, for Opposition motions.

12. Ibid., Col. 436; The Congress Bulletin (January-June, 1963), p. 13; for Hanumanthaiya's demand 'to see that the non-alignment policy was changed'; also Galbraith, n. 7, p. 479.

13. Organiser, January 7, 1963.

Nehru himself lashed out soon observing that "conservetive groups at home attack domestic policy and so also they attack foreign policy"[14] and subsequently observed that, "Fascist and Nazi tendencies are on the increase in our country ... it has a rather upsetting effect on me"[15].

In spite of heavy odds, however, Nehru held the fort and non-alignment survived the internal pressures to give it up and tag India to the Western bandwagon.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE : THE UNITED STATES

In the midst of a military disaster, on October 22, 1962, Nehru appealed to all the Governments of the world (except Portugal and South Africa) for general sympathy and support against Chinese aggresion.

In an urgent quest for arms from whichever source possible, India appealed to the United States and the United Kingdom for the same.[16][17]

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14. Congress Bulletin (January-June, 1963), p. 25.

15. Ibid. (July-August, 1963), p. 43; also Pravda (Moscow, August 10, 1963), P. Kutsobin and M. Pastukhov, "Reactionaries Manoeuvres in India", warned: "India's future will greatly depend on whether ... the country will be able to halt the headlong attack of internal reaction and to repel the pressure of Western imperialist circles".

16. October 23, 1962: The Times of India, The Hindu.

17. T.C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row: 1965), p. 663; also The New York Times, October 27, 1962, for Nehru's message to Kennedy.

The United States preoccupied as it was with the Cuban crisis,[18] proceeded to support India as that crisis blew over, and on October 27, 1962, Ambassador Galbraith declared U.S. support to the McMahon Line.[19] President Kennedy in a letter to Nehru, pledged military support and sympathy to India and also assured India that the United States would not coerce her into a pact,[20] in implementation of which the first airlift of U.S. arms reached Calcutta on November 3, 1962 beginning a steady flow of emergency military requirements.[21]

In continuation of the prompt U.S. and U.K. response, the Harriman-Sandys Mission[22] visited India towards the third week of November, 1962 and initiated talks with Pakistan for a joint

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18. J.K. Galbraith, n. 8, p. 435; also The Daily Telegraph (London), October 26, 1962.

19. Galbraith, Ibid.,pp. 439-440; for previous U.S. stand, which did not endorse the McMahon Line, American Foreign Policy:Current Documents, 1959 (Washington: U.S.G.P.O.),pp.1190-91. However, the former Secretary of State, Christian Herter, had condemned China's use of force over the border dispute; the McMahon Line, the formulation of the controversial Simla Convention (1914) was claimed by India to depict India's north-eastern frontier, and denied by China and ultimately became one of the serious sources of the border dispute.

20. The New York Times, October 24, 1962; had promised the sympathy and moral support of the free world "regardless of India's unrealistic policies in the past" with respect to China; also, see The Times, October 30, 1962.

21. Galbraith,n. 8, p. 431, for India's apprehensions on this account and talk with Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai; The National Herald, October 23, 1962: "India will accept unconditional aid from whatever quarter she will get ... just as she will buy whatever military equipment she wants from whatever source she can get. But there will be no giving up of non-alignment".

22. W. Averell Harriman was the then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State while Duncan Sandys, happened to be the then British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

defence of the subcontinent. These talks, along with the very significant military collaboration between India and the United States and the Voice of America episode constituted the most important ramifications of India- U.S. relations in that critical phase of India's foreign policy.

INDIA - PAKISTAN TALKS OVER KASHMIR

On the basis of negotiations with the Harriman-Sandys Mission, Nehru agreed to reopen the Kashmir issue. On November 29, 1961, a Nehru-Ayub joint communique[23] announced the intention of beginning talks soon so as to reach an honourable and equitable settlement of Kashmir and other related matters.

On the next day (November 30, 1962), Nehru, in a statement before the Lok Sabha expressed willingness for discussions with Pakistan on the issue, but cautiously emphasized that any upsetting of the prevalent arrangements in Kashmir would be very harmful to India and Pakistan, which definitely revealed that he "did not take kindly to the introduction of Kashmir into the discussion of India's requirements for defence against China"[24] and which also signified "that multitude of difficulties lay ahead"[25]. This forced

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23. Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents: 1947-64 (Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966), p. 368; The New York Times, November 30, 1962, called it "an immensely encouraging development", also to Harriman and Sandys and his assessment of the joint communique as a historical document, while Harriman and Sandys considered the defence of the subcontinent to be "a single problem".

24. The Times (London), December 1, 1962.

25. The New York Times, December 1, 1962.

Sandys to dash back to New Delhi from Pakistan. Subsequently, Nehru clarified that the Lok Sabha statement did not imply any pre-conditions for the India-Pakistan talks.[26]

The India-Pakistan Ministerial Talks started at Rawalpindi (December 27-29, 1962) under the ominous shadow of Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement covering 'regions of Sinkiang province and a 300-mile stretch' of Pakistan - controlled Kashmir which forced President Ayub to talks with the U.K. and U.S. envoys, and also with the leader of the Indian delegation, Sardar Swaran Singh, as well as the leader of the Pakistan delegation, Z.A. Bhutto, in order to assure them that the Agreement was not meant to prejudice the negotiations.[27]

After the gloomy start, the delegations had 'a constructive exchange of views'[28] and agreed on a moratorium on press polemics.[29]

Though the "hope and wish" of the U.S. Government was for the success of the Kashmir negotiations,[30] there were also cautious

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26. The Hindu (Madras), December 2, 1962.

27. The Times (London), December 28, 1962; The Guardian (Manchester), December 28, 1962, thought that the Sino-Pak Agreement certainly reduced chances of Indo-Pak Agreement; The New York Times, December 28, 1962, while noting that the talks had been going on in Peking since May, 1962, assessed it as a propaganda gesture against India; The Daily Telegraph (London), December 29, 1962, noted that the bombshell announcement and its discourteous timing had affected the Indian delegation, which, but for the role of 'midwives' played by the U.S. and the U.K. envoys, would have left in a huff.

28. R.P. Stebbins, The U.S. in World Affairs, 1962 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 189.

29. The Hindusthan Times (New Delhi), December 30, 1962, for full text of the joint communique.

30. A.F.P. despatch, December 29, 1962, datelined Washington, for U.S. State Department spokesman Lincoln White's views.

soundings against premature optimism, and The New York Times (January 2, 1963) ultimately hoped that the "fiery breath of the Communist Chinese dragon" would "provide a powerful impetus for a settlement" and towards the fulfilment of which the Anglo-American envoys in the subcontinent were expected to mount vigil and keep a watching brief from the sidelines.[31]

While the Pakistan Times (December 31, 1962) relished that India had been forced to reopen the Kashmir issue including the question of a plebiscite in Kashmir, the Dawn (December 30, 1962) commented, "We may predict how it will all end" but refrained from the same, and also promised restraint until, "Nehru opens his mouth too wide again".

In India, the Ministry of External Affairs noted the "close collaboration between Peking and Rawalpindi" and also that the Pakistani attitude to China was dictated purely by its animosity to India.[32] While The Hindusthan Times (December 30, 1962) observed that the talks ended in a brighter atmosphere than that at the start, the Times of India (January 1, 1963) assessed that at least nothing was being done to vitiate the atmosphere.

However, by the time the second round (January 16-19, 1963) started in New Delhi, polemics in the press had been launched in full swing.[33] While Pakistan wanted U.S. pressure on her behalf[34]

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31. Dawn (Karachi), December 29,1962, London despatch.

32. The Times (London), December 28, 1962.

33. Dawn (Karachi), January 16, 1963, and the National Herald (New Delhi), January 17, 1963.

34. Sunday Standard (New Delhi), January 20, 1963.

it was apprehended in the U.S. press that only intervention by the Ambassador in India, J.K. Galbraith, could lead to a continuation of the talks,[35] which led the Pakistan Times (January 21, 1963) to conclude that "Pakistan should stop chasing the will-O'-the-wisp of a settlement". However, Sardar Swaran Singh said that the differences might be said to have been "narrowed down to some extent"[36] and the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mohamma d Ali also noted "slight progress"[37] and U.S. officials heaved a sigh of relief that the continuation of talks would help them against Congressional critics.[38]

During the third round of talks held in Karachi (February 8-10, 1963), India offered minor adjustments along the ceasefire-line while Pakistan demanded plebiscite in Kashmir.[39]

The fourth round of talks, held in Calcutta (March 13-14,1963) according to the Dawn (February 13, 1963), had been arranged under Anglo-U.S. pressure and was overshadowed by the Pakistan-China Boundary Agreement (signed in Peking and enforced March 2, 1963)[40] and could not achieve anything better.

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35. Indian Express (New Delhi), January 21, 1963.

36. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), January 20, 1963.

37. Pakistan Times (Lahore), January 22, 1963.

38. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), January 22, 1963.

39. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 280.

40. U.S. Foreign Policy, Current Documents, pp. 780-83.

As the fifth round started in Karachi (April 22-25, 1963) on a note of pessimism[41], Z.A. Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan delegation, declared that though the fifth, "in a test series is generally the last ... there can be a sixth round if there is substantial progress"[42]. However, when it was decided on a sixth round, both the sides placed the onus on the other with the only benefit being the precarious continuation of the "fruitfully fruitless" talks[43].

The sixth round, held in New Delhi (May 15-16, 1963), was preceded by an editorial comment in the Pakistan Observer (Dacca, May 13, 1963), captioned "Back To The Starting Point?", which, unfortunately, proved itself to be true, and bore no fruit and after which, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, persuaded Nehru to accept the association of a third party which was alleged to have been subsequently withdrawn[44], which led President Kennedy to admit that the Kashmir issue was "further from being settled today than it was six months ago"[45].

Thus, India had to reopen the Kashmir issue in her hour of

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41. Pakistan Times, April 22, 1963 and the Times of India, April 23, 1963.

42. Hindusthan Times, April 23, 1963.

43. Indian Express, April 26, 1963.

44. R.P. Stebbins, U.S. in World Affairs, 1963 and 1964, C.F.R., p. 169.

45. Idem, Press Conference, September 12, 1963.

peril due to U.S. diplomatic pressure[46], which created deep public resentment in India. The Indian policy-makers also did not find it palatable, while it raised high hopes leading ultimately to disillusionment in Pakistan. It did not solve the Kashmir problem, but further complicated India-U.S. relations.

THE VOICE OF AMERICA EPISODE

The border conflict with China revealed some serious gaps in the Indian broadcasting machinery which failed to cover India's north-eastern borderlands as well as Southeast Asia properly.

In the process of the search for a powerful transmitter, which started in November, 1962, the Government of India received an offer from the Voice of America[47] with which officials of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting continued negotiations from March-June, 1963 as a result of which the formal contract was signed between N. Singh, Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, and W. Weathersby, Public Affairs Counsellor, U.S. Embassy, New Delhi, on July 9, 1963, and letters were exchanged between B.P. Bhatt, Director-General, All India Radio and H. Loomis,[48]

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46. Hindusthan Times, April 8, 1963, for a diplomatic objection to the term pressure, by Dean Rusk; Times of India, January 3, 1963, for a less, or more than diplomatic approach by J.K. Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador in India; National Herald, January 17, 1963, editorial, for Indian reaction.

47. E.J. McCarthy, Dictionary of American Politics (Pelican, 1962), p. 161; The Voice of America (henceforth V.O.A.), is the 'International broadcasting agency' controlled by the previous U.S. Information Agency (now the International Communication Agency) which 'broadcasts programs in the local language to Communist nations — both behind and outside the Iron curtain and to other areas of the free world'. It constituted one of the major instruments of the Cold War.

48. Times of India, October 15, 1963, for the text of Prime Minister's statement.

Director, V.O.A.[49]

The Agreement as well as the procedure, created acute controversy as it reached the press.

Under the Agreement, the one-thousand-kilowatt medium transmitter, worth Rupees one crore, was to be provided by the V.O.A. to the Government of India on payment of a token sum of one Rupee only, while the U.S. Government would pay one Rupee per annum to the Government of India for the regular use of three hours of air-time for relaying programmes to Southeast Asia for an initial five-year period. The United States was also to supply forty-five thousand dollars worth of instruments per annum for the transmitter to India free of cost, as well as other equipments for installing a first-class self-contained unit in the region.[50] Moreover, while India would have no control over the V.O.A. broadcasts, she undertook not to make any broadcasts in Urdu and Bengali.

As for the procedure followed, subsequently, it came out that the usual formalities had not been observed. It had not undergone any scrutiny by the Secretaries Committee of the Cabinet, nor had the Ministry of External Affairs processed it and neither the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet nor the Cabinet itself had ever been consulted. Most of the members of the Cabinet came to know about the Agreement only when it burst upon them through the press.[51]

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49. Times of India, July 26, 1963.

50. Dawn (Karachi), July 11, 1963; National Herald, July 18, 1963 and Times of India, July 26, 1963.

51. Indian Express, August 12, 1963; The Statesman, July 19, 1963, specially, "Political Commentary"; Hindusthan Times, August 28, 1963.

The Indian press generally reacted sharply with some minor, though notable, exceptions. The Patriot (July 17, 1963), in its editorial called it a "dangerous deal" which would put to rest Indian "claims of non-alignment" and the National Herald (July 18, 1963), close to the Congress leadership, considered it "wrong in principle and may be damaging in practice" and wanted it scrapped while the Hindusthan Times of the same date had little objection to the Agreement as it assessed the "immediate advantages substantial".

Initially, on behalf of the Government of India, the Union Deputy Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Sham Nath, defended the Agreement in terms of "reasons of economy and the emergency" and also explained that a Nationalist Chinese from Hong Kong had been asked to supervise the Chinese news and broadcasting services of the All-India Radio.[52]

A very influential section of the press raised highly critical voices against the Minister concerned, and also did not hesitate to point out the responsibility of the Prime Minister.[53] The Times of India (July 19, 1963) in a hard-hitting editorial found the Agreement to be throughly objectionable on "grounds of non-alignment policy, on those of national sovereignty, on those of our

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52. Times of India, July 18, 1963 and Hindusthan Times, July 21, 1963; The Hindu, July 21, 1963, for a most ridiculous defence of the Agreement and Indian Express, July 19, 1963, also for support to the same.

53. Times of India, July 18, 1963, and Krishan and Prem Bhatia in the Statesman and the Indian Express (both of July 19, 1963).

geographical relationship with China" while the Statesman of the same date also warned against it.

As for reactions abroad, the Guardian (Manchester), in an editorial ironically spoke about the Indians "both eating their non-alignment cake and having it" with reference to the V.O.A. Agreement, and the role of the U.S. Air Force in emergency airlift to India, while The Times (London, July 23, 1963) considered the Agreement as an "ill-considered step" and in a similar vein, spoke about new dimensions of India's non-alignment. The Dawn (Karachi) July 19, 1963) attributed the move to the "policy and plan of the Indian leadership and Government" while the Hindu (July 21, 1963), in its dispatch from Moscow revealed Soviet apprehensions over the issue and the then proposed joint exercises by the Indian and the U.S. Air Force as having been evaluated as instances of "growing influence of rightist forces in India".

As a very significant and articulate section of public opinion in India came to assert itself against the V.O.A. Agreement, the Prime Minister took note of it and admitted that the Agreement was "an infringement of our policy of non-alignment"[54]. However, a section of the Congress Parliamentary Party Executive Committee wanted him to honour the Agreement,[55] while others wanted some modifications[56] and Nehru informed them that negotiations had been

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54. Times of India, August 4, 1963.

55. Hindusthan Times, August 5, 1963; see, the Patriot (August 6, 1963) for a sharp retort in the editorial, "The Stooges".

56. Times of India, August 7, 1963.

started for the revision of the Agreement as certain aspects of the same were found to have been not in conformity with India's foreign policy.

Among the other political parties, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh Working Committee asserted that there was nothing in the V.O.A. Agreement that "infringed India's policy of non-alignment".[57] Swatentra Party leader C. Rajagopalachari deplored the way the Prime Minister attempted to back out of the Agreement and attributed the retreat to outside pressures[58] while the Communist Party of India demanded repudiation of the deal as, along with the proposed joint air exercises[59] they constituted a "perilous shift to the right".

As negotiations with the V.O.A. and the U.S. Government failed to produce any positive results, the Government of India gradually became convinced that, "If it cannot be revised radically, we shall do without it"[60], and on February 11, 1964, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting stated in the Rajya Sabha that so far as the Government of India was concerned, the V.O.A. issue was a closed chapter.

Though nobody was punished, and the Prime Minister assumed all responsibility for the deal,[61] it revealed some dangerous

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57. Hindu, August 11, 1963.

58. Indian Express, August 22, 1963.

59. Times of India, August 12, 1963; also Dawn, August 12, 1963.

60. New York Times, September 4, 1963.

61. Times of India, August 15, 1963; also Hindusthan Times, September 4, 1963, for Nehru's reply to Bhupesh Gupta in the Rajya Sabha on September 3, 1963.

weaknesses in the conduct of India's foreign policy. No doubt alertness of the press and public opinion saved the country from greater damage and definitely vitiated India-U.S. relations to a certain extent; while leaving enough questions unanswered.

U.S. MILITARY AID TO INDIA

The Sino-Indian Border Conflict (October 20 - November 21, 1962) proved to be a veritable military disaster for India. The Chinese 'exacted over 6,000 Indian casualties and offered a conclusive demonstration of their military superiority'.[62] Prime Minister Nehru admitted, "We were unprepared to meet a massive invasion of two or three divisions"[63] while an eminent Indian soldier, General J.N. Chaudhuri later confessed, "We were woefully under-equipped and undertrained for opposition at heights, particularly for an enemy like the Chinese",[64] while an official post-mortem revealed shortcomings in the higher direction of the war also.[65]

As the border-conflict escalated, India sought military aid from both Eastern and the Western countries,[66] and emergency arms

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61. Times of India, August 15, 1963; also Hindusthan Times, September 4, 1963; for Nehru's reply to Bhupesh Gupta in the Rajya Sabha on September 3, 1963.

62. The U.S. in World Affairs, 1962, n. 28, p. 184.

63. Lok Sabha Debates, 3rd Series, Column 122 (November 8, 1962), p. 184.

64. Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri: An Autobiography As Narrated to B.K.Narayan (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p. 175.

65. Kumhi Krishnan, n. 9, pp. 73-74. This remains a controversial topic.

66. New York Times, October 22, 1962.

airlift started within days of the Chinese attack[67] earning thereby Indian gratitude.[68] On the U.S. side also it had been assessed as the beginning of 'a historic new chapter' in the relations between the two countries as it happened to be the first direct appeal to the United States since India's independence for military assistance.[69] However, cautious as the United States was, she did not agree to Indian requests for U.S. aerial action against the Chinese.[70]

In order to "get a more precise idea of what the Indians need to protect their territorial integrity", the U.S. President decided to despatch the Harriman Mission to India which also included a Defence Department team headed by Assistant Secretary of Defence Paul Nitze[71] which was closely followed by a Joint Commonwealth-U.S. Air Defence Mission to assess the requirements of the Indian Air Force[72] led by Air Commodore C.J. Mount, R.A.F. and Brigadier General James B. Tipton, U.S.A.F.[73] which was further

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67. U.S. in World Affairs, 1962, n. 28, p. 186; also see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1018, for Note from the U.S. Secretary of State to the Indian Ambassador on emergency arms aid; also Ibid., pp.1018-19, for U.S. assurance to Pakistan against any misuse of the above.

68. Hindustan Times, October 31, 1962, for editorial comment: "Now at last we know who are our friends".

69. New York Times, October 30, 1962, New Delhi, correspondent A.M. Rosenthal's report who noted that Nehru 'did not ask for U.S. troops'.

70. J.K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, n. 8, pp. 487-88.

71. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1020.

72. Henceforth I.A.F.

73. U.S. Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p.762, the announcement to the effect was made on January 23, 1963.

fortified by a 12-men team of Defence Production Experts headed by Carroll H. Staley in February, 1963 for the expansion of India's defence production capabilities.[74]

On July 22, 1963, the State Department announced agreement among the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and India, regarding measures for aerial defence of India against possible Chinese attack under which the United States was to provide radar installations and train Indian personnel for the same, to undertake periodic joint training exercises in India, and also to consult with the Government of India in case of any Chinese aggression, without, however, any automatic commitment on her part.[75]

In pursuance of the above, under the "overall aegis" of the I.A.F., a Joint Training Exercise, '<u>Shiksha</u>', was conducted in India (November 9 - 19, 1963) in which about four thousand I.A.F. officers and airmen and seven hundred and fifty U.K., U.S. and Australian Air Force personnel took part which gave the I.A.F. "valuable experience regarding the latest techniques of air defence"[76] and which was considered to have been 'highly reassuring from the standpoint of India's protection against a Chinese air attack'.[77]

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74. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 762-63.

75. <u>American Foreign Policy: Current Documents</u>, 1963, p. 768.

76. <u>Report, 1963-64, Ministry of Defence</u>, Government of India, p. 53.

77. R.P. Stebbins, <u>U.S. in World Affairs, 1963</u> (Harper and Row, 1964), p. 174.

While in supplying the emergency military aid[78] the United States was prompt enough, however, later on, the going was far from smooth as the United States tagged it to its predominant Pakistani connection[79] and also to an early solution of the Kashmir problem.

While India had expected that the United States could help her best "by providing us for the short-term with the things we lack and by helping us for the long term to find the means of producing them ourselves"[80], the United States decided that "anything that could be economically supplied to India would come from the U.S.A."[81]

Subsequently, India had to recognise the painful reality that the United States was not enthusiastic about providing teeth to the Indian forces in the form of sophisticated aircraft and appropriate advanced military hardware. The then Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, who had negotiated and had tried his level best to meet India's urgent arms need from the United States, concluded that the latter had tried "to keep us as much dependent on her as

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78. H.A. Hovey, U.S. Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 101; for official estimates of sixty million dollars which consisted mainly of equipments for mountain divisions and temporary loan of aircraft with crew.

79. Guardian, December 29, 1962, for Ambassador Galbraith's assertion.

80. Hindu, April 18, 1963, for New York Times' interview with Nehru.

81. Times of India, January 3, 1963, for Ambassador Galbraith's view.

possible and was not happy about our agreement with the Soviet Union for the production of the MIG in India"[82].

While one must appreciate that the prompt U.S. military aid to India was a very useful and timely one in India's hour of crisis, as the apprehensions of another Chinese onslaught gradually faded away, India could well take stock of the serious limitations of U.S. military aid which subserved U.S. global strategy in the region. Hence, the latter was unwilling to fulfil India's long-term military requirements and mainly sought to bolster Pakistan. Hence, the military honeymoon became a short-lived one. Even this short-lived collaboration led ultimately to certain highly controversial activities like the installation of secret nuclear gadgets in the Himalayas[83] on the basis of a joint enterprise between the two governments and their intelligence agencies.

It appears that alertness on the part of the Indian leadership which could ignore internal protests and suspicions only at

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82. Supra, Kunhi Krishnan, p. 77. Ibid., pp. 75-82, for an estimate of vital military equipments procured from the U.S.S.R. for the Indian forces and also Chavan's statement that the United States in between October, 1962 - September, 1965 fulfilled only about forty-five per cent of its total commitment amounting to Rs. 36.13 (in crores). Supersonic aircraft denied to India, was supplied by the United States to Pakistan.

83. India Backgrounder (New Delhi, May 15, 1968), for details of the then collaboration for the same between the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation which was within the knowledge of three Prime Ministers - Nehru, Shastri and Mrs. Indira Gandhi (vide Prime Minister Morarjee Desai's statement in the Parliament, April 17, 1978).

its peril[84] prevented the West's selling the 'Air Umbrella' in India. Indeed, Exercise 'Shiksha' was nothing near the Western idea, which led to subsequent laments that hopes of 'closer if informal military cooperation'[85] did not materialize.

CONCLUSION

The India-China border conflict became a Godsend to the United States as it had provided the latter with an unprecedented opportunity to consolidate her relationship with India as a steadfast friend in her hour of dire need. The grim realities of the situation forced the Indian leadership to look up to the United States.

The emergency military aid played a very important role by way of boosting Indian morale, and also as a token of U.S. friendship for an India in distress which appreciated it.

However, it gradually became clear the United States was guided mainly by its global policy of containment of Communism, more so with respect to China in Asia. She expected that the border conflict would 'awaken India to the dangers of communism and the need to cooperate with the West ... would undermine the position of the then united Communist Party of India ... might bring India and Pakistan closer together and the United States might benefit from the trouble it created between the U.S.S.R. and China'.[86]

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84. Indian Express, February 22, 1963.

85. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (Praeger, 1972), p. 181.

86. Ibid., p. 316.

An Indian scholar has attributed even the prompt U.S. response to 'the negative image of China rather than of any positive image of India'.[87]

In the U.S. scheme of things, its ally, Pakistan, had a very special position. Hence, the United States was eager not to strengthen India vis-a-vis Pakistan. On the other hand, she sought to move in a way so as to strengthen her ally's position, at least, partially. Even when she endorsed the McMahon Line, it implied only a manoeuvre to placate India as it excluded any reference to the area of over which Pakistan had placed demands. Opening the Kashmir Pandora's box under U.S. pressure could not be relished by an India threatened by China, and which already harboured enough apprehensions about the U.S. role on this particular issue, even with reference to the distant prospects of the so-called joint defence of the subcontinent, as it was amply clear to her that Pakistan would not participate in anything of the sort against China. Hence, the six test matches ultimately proved rather costly to the umpires themselves.

The V.O.A. deal created further suspicions in India about the designs of the United States.

India's expectations about long-term military aid also could not be fulfilled as it came to be tagged to a political solution of the Kashmir problem vis-a-vis Pakistan. The United

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87. S. Gupta, "The United States' Reaction", International Studies, July-October, 1963, p. 57.

States could not strengthen India to the detriment of her ally. Her alliance with as well as the vital U.S. intelligence installations stationed in Pakistan played a very important role in this regard.[88] The United States, through its offers of air-umbrella, attempted to draw India into a semi-military pact with the ultimate aim of dragging her into its the then Asian strategy of containing China elsewhere too.[89] Hence, one Indian scholar concludes that while India was mainly 'concerned about her territorial integrity and her ability to face China on her frontiers', the United States wanted India 'to play a central role in the anti-Communist struggle in Southeast Asia'.[90]

It goes to the credit of India that before long she could painfully realise that her vital national interests fitted only temporarily with those of the United States and arranged her policies so as to meet the twin threats of China and Pakistan. Actually, the border conflict placed India-U.S. relations on a more mature foundation bereft of many dangerous illusions.

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88. Ibid., p. 223.

89. J.K. Galbraith, n. 8, pp. 503-4 and 523.

90. See V.P. Dutt, in A.M. Halpern (ed.), Policies Toward China: Views From Six Continents (McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 227.

91. A very able student of India-U.S. relations, M.S. Venkataramani came to conclude that India had committed a serious mistake in seeking help from the U.S. et al. following the conflict with China, see M.S. Venkataramani, "Converging Interests", Seminar (August, 1967), p. 33.

CHAPTER VI

INDIA-PAKISTAN BORDER CONFLICTS (1965)

Before India could recover from the trauma of 1962, it had to face two conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 — the first one, in the Rann of Kutch, was enacted as a prologue to be closely followed up by a major conflict over the old Pakistani theme of Kashmir.

In both, U.S. military hardware supplied to Pakistan were used against India, thereby creating complications in India-U.S. relations. The Kashmir conflict had to be ended with Soviet-U.S. initiative in the U.N. Security Council, while the further consolidation of peace in the sub-continent was achieved through the initiative of the Soviet Union.

LEGACY OF 1962

The Sino-Indian Border conflict (1962) was a momentous negative development which left its clear imprint on international relations in the South Asian region for years to come.

While the Indian military setbacks weakened her in the eyes of her neighbours and before the world, the extension of U.S. military aid to India, in the context, brought immediate disillusionment in Pakistan,[1]

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1. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends, Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 133-and 158; The National Assembly of Pakistan was summoned by the President of Pakistan and met in secret sessions (November 21-22, 1962), on the issue and was addressed by President Ayub Khan. On its first open session (November 22, 1962), the Assembly took up an official motion moved by the Minister for External Affairs, Mohammed Ali, on the emergency situation which posed serious problems to Pakistan's security because of large-scale supply of arms to India. The speech warned Pakistan's Western allies, specially, the United States, spoke cordially about China, and Pakistan's border negotiations with her, while assessing that India was "making a mountain out of a mole hill ... in order to bamboozle the Anglo-American powers into giving her military supplies". See also National Assembly of Pakistan: Debates, Official Report, (November, 22, 1962, (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1963), pp. 1-11, for full text.

which gradually started drifting towards China[2] while maintaining the alliances with the United States. Within the country, anti-Indian frenzy[3] created serious pressures on the Ayub regime which faced the first major challenge from the opposition during the Presidential elections of 1965.[4]

In India, the new Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, did not enjoy the immense political stature of his predecessor, Prime Minister Nehru. Moreover, before he could consolidate his position, he was faced with serious internal dissensions, which created an image abroad, specially, in Pakistan, of an India falling apart.[5] Moreover, towards the end of 1964, the Government of India had undertaken steps to hasten the integration of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union.[6] This created deep resentment in Pakistan.

Pakistan's China policy caused strains in its relationship

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2. Z.A. Bhutto, the then official spokesman for foreign affairs had declared on November 26, 1962, "Our friendship with China is unconditional and ... it is not dependent on any factor and ... we will not barter or bargain our friendship with great people's (sic-R.B.). Republic of China and it is against the security and the interest of Pakistan to make any acquisition in that regard". Ibid., Debates, November 26, 1962, p. 93. Starting with the Boundary Agreement (March 2, 1963), there followed a whole crop of Sino-Pak agreements.

3. Kuldip Nayar, Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Subcontinent (Vikas, 1972), pp. 110-112.

4. President Ayub defeated his rival Miss Fatima Jinnah, on January 2, 1965. Miss Jinnah, however, claimed that the elections had been rigged, see, Keesing's, 1965-1966, p. 20617.

5. Supra, n. 3.

6. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 194.

with the United States, which was then apprehensive of China,[7] while the U.S. suggestion, during the U.N. Security Council debates on the Kashmir problem (1964), of bilateral negotiations and mediation had caused deep resentment in Pakistan,[8] while causing apprehensions in India.[9]

POSTPONEMENT OF SHASTRI VISIT

In this background, the United States on April 16, 1965, abruptly announced simultaneous postponent of the proposed visits of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri (previously scheduled on April 25-26, 1965) and Pakistani President Ayub Khan (previously scheduled on June 2-3, 1965) which caused many a resentment. In India, this came to be assessed as a rebuff to her criticism of U.S. policy with respect to Vietnam and was roundly condemned in the Parliament. While Sardar Swaran Singh (Minister for External

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7. G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), pp.274-77; also see, W.D. Palmer, South Asia and U.S. Policy (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), pp.39-40. Even before he was sworn in, President Ayub along with Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto visited China (March 2-9, 1965), which was followed up by a Boundary Protocol between China and Pakistan on March 26, 1965, which drew protests from India. See Keesing's, 1965-66, pp. 20694, for details.

8. S.C.O.R., 109st Mtg., February 14, 1964; Dawn (Karachi), February 17, 1964).

9. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had declared on April 13, 1964, in the Lok Sabha: "both Pakistan and China have larger objectives against India ... We shall have to be prepared, for all attempts on their part to harm us" and considered it "extraordinary that even in these circumstances some of the Western powers are inclined towards Pakistan and help it in regard to Kashmir. The Kashmir issue would have been solved long ago but for Western help to Pakistan"; Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. V, March, 1963 - May, 1964 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1968), pp. 218, 215 respectively.

Affairs) spoke about the unusual manner in which the step was taken, and which was bound to create misunderstanding in India, he asserted that India held the view that there could only be a political, and no military solution, of the Vietnam issue, and which view was unlikely to be changed only just because some other country disliked it, the New York Times also could visualise the Prime Minister's personal anger over the abrupt postponement.[10] No doubt this step caused a deterioration in the U.S. position in India.

THE RANN OF KUTCH CLASH

In the context of the deteriorating international scenario in the South Asian subcontinent, the unfinished business of partition led to a military confrontation and conflict between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch (April 9, 1965).

The disputed Rann of Kutch covered an area of about 8,400 square miles constituting "a vast expanse of naked tidal mudflats, a black desolation flanked with saline efflorescences". During May to October, it is flooded by both high tides and swollen rivers creating small islands known as bets.[11] The area is situated in the border region between the former Princely State of Kutch (in Gujarat in India) and the former province of Sind (in the then West Pakistan).

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10. Keesing's, 1965-66, p. 20811A.

11. Ibid., p. 20927.

The dispute covered about 3,500 square miles of the area north of the 20th parallel, which was claimed by Pakistan.[12] As the question had not been decided during the partition of India, it was kept simmering leading to clashes earlier in 1956. Till the outbreak of hostilities in 1965, no demarcation of the border had been undertaken.

Prior to the armed conflict, there were talks about prospects of oil in this 'piece of desolate land'.[13] On behalf of the Government of India, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission had conducted prospecting in areas nearby, and the Government of Pakistan had authorised the U.S. Sun Oil Company for prospecting in the Rann and its off-shore region.[14]

Prospects of India establishing a naval base in the port of Kandla in the Gulf of Kutch (in the proximity of Karachi) was considered to have been another factor,[15] while the ominous possibility of India using the uninhabited region for a future nuclear explosion was also mentioned.[16]

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12. H.R. Gupta, The Kutch Affair (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1969), Chapter Five, for Pakistan's case; also see, The Indian Society for International Law, The Kutch-Sind Border Question: A Collection of Documents with Comments, New Delhi, 1965.

13. G.W. Chaudhury, n. 7, p. 288.

14. Keesing's, n. 10, p. 20927; New York Times, April 27, 1965; also The Times (London), April 29, 1965.

15. New York Times, idem.

16. The Sunday Telegraph (London), May 2, 1965.

The fighting broke out on the 9th of April, 1965, with Pakistani forces attacking Sardar border-post manned by Gujarat police with Indian forces moving in quickly. By April 23, 1965, it had escalated to a sixty-mile front and according to one Indian version, twenty-five thousand Pakistani troops with tanks and heavy artillery were involved in the combat. Because of difficulties of terrain and the onset of the monsoons, India could not deploy tanks in the area.[17] Intermittent fighting continued upto the end of May, 1965.

THE CEASEFIRE

The British Government took the initiative for a ceasefire with informal messages from the British Prime Minister to his Indian counterpart as well as to the President of Pakistan on April 27, 1965, followed up by informal talks at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference (June 17-25, 1965), which led to the agreement between the parties involved in the conflict (June 30, 1965) with the ceasefire coming into force from July 1, 1965.

The agreement provided for *status quo ante* (as on January 1, 1965), withdrawal of troops within seven days and also ministerial talks on border demarcation, and, in case of a disagreement, reference to an impartial tribunal.[18]

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17. *Keesing's*, n. 10, pp. 20927-28, for details of military operations.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 20929; for text of agreement; on February 19, 1968, the International Tribunal delivered its judgment awarding Pakistan about three hundred square miles of the disputed territory.

ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

While the fighting was going on, the Government of India protested to the United States against the use of U.S. arms by Pakistan and also drew attention to Sino-Pak collusion.[19]

On April 26, 1965, the Indian Air Force[20] photographed 45-ton U.S. patton tanks used in combat by the Pakistani forces in Kutch which was released by the Defence Ministry on April 28, 1965, which Pakistan promptly denied, and,on the other hand, alleged Indian use of U.S. ammunition which was subsequently found untrue on verification by U.S. military observers.

On April 28, 1965, the U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan sought President Ayub's permission to allow American military observers to visit the combat-zone to verify the allegations. Subsequently, the U.S. Ambassador admitted that the Pakistani brigade in the Rann had been equipped, partly, by an American military aid group, while President Ayub declared in Karachi (May 4, 1965) that Pakistan was entitled to use all arms in its possession to defend the country.[21]

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19. Asian Recorder, 1965, pp. 6427 and 6227, the latter, for the earlier Indian protest to the United States on the use of U.S. military hardware by Pakistan in Ceasefire Line violations in Jammu and Kashmir (Mrs. L. Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs, Lok Sabha, December 8, 1964).

20. Henceforth I.A.F.

21. Asian Recorder, 1965, pp. 6465-66; also, Keesing's, n. 10, p. 20928, on the U.S. arms issue.

The United States assured India, however, that the self-defence provisions of the U.S.-Pakistan Mutual Assistance Pact did not cover the Kutch conflict. Hence, Pakistan had no justification in using U.S. weapons there, and India assessed having received "to some extent a satisfactory answer" to her protest, and U.S. Embassy sources in New Delhi confirmed on May 22, 1965, that the U.S. had lodged a strong protest with Pakistan Government which, however, was kept a secret so as not to affect the ceasefire negotiations.[22]

Pakistan's use of U.S. military hardware against India in the said conflict created a row in India. In the Lok Sabha (April 28, 1965), H.N. Mukherjee (Communist Party of India) charged that the Pakistani attacks had been facilitated by U.S. arms, and also that the United States and the United Kingdom had never forgiven India for her independent foreign policy, while S.N. Dwivedi (Praja Socialist Party) accused the United States of connivance as it had failed to utter 'a word in condemnation' of Pakistan's use of U.S. arms while putting conditions on India. V.K. Krishna Menon (Congress) wanted the Government of India to tell the United States that arms meant to be used against Communism were being used against India while recalling Dulles' assurance that if this happened the United States would stop supplies to Pakistan. Raghunath Singh (Congress) also wanted the United States and the United Kingdom, in keeping with their promises, to stop military

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22. Keesing's, idem.

aid to Pakistan immediately, while S.N. Chaturvedi (Congress) assessed that while non-alignment was good, it could not work so long as India was dependent on foreign military assistance.[23]

In the press, Frank Moraes, Chief Editor of the Indian Express, held the Western military alliances with Pakistan mainly responsible for the conflict and in an article (May 3, 1965), strongly advocated India's giving up non-alignment and joining with the U.S.S.R.

IMPACT IN THE UNITED STATES

The New York Times (April 26, 1965), though it accused India of having blocked plebiscite in Kashmir, advocated U.N. mediation on the issue as the United States happened to be handicapped by President Johnson's postponement of Shastri and Ayub visits and warned that "unless the fighting in the Rann of Kutch is quickly stopped it could spread to Kashmir". It also observed "it looks as if the Pakistanis were the aggressors". The Christian Science Monitor (Boston, April 27, 1965) noted that a section of opinion in India believed in a Sino-Pakistan collusion to secure widest dispersal of Indian forces for launching an attack on Kashmir but urged India later (May 9, 1965) for a "generous agreement" with Pakistan on the Kutch dispute.

In the U.S. Senate, Senator Wayne Morse, in a report to the Foreign Relations Committee observed that "Pakistan is busily

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23. Idem.

making friendly gestures towards China indulging in its apparent true vocation of warlike manoeuvres on the borders of India"[24], thereby damaging Indian defence efforts with respect to China.

ASSESSMENT

The battles in the Rann of Kutch were in the nature of a very limited conflict.[25] But they ominously foreshadowed the shape of things to come. It was the 'biggest armed clash between the two armies since the Kashmir war of 1948 ... The conflict over the useless Rann of Kutch was yet another symptom of the irreconcilable hostility between Pakistan and India'.[26]

To the Indian military leadership, it appeared to be sort of a probing or a diversionary tactic for a real offensive elsewhere.[27] It has also been assessed as a 'low-cost test of Indian will and capabilities'[28] on the part of Pakistan. It has been observed that in this conflict President Ayub was 'concerned with taking measure of the Indian army's capabilities vis-a-vis his

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24. Indian Express (New Delhi), May 1, 1965; Washington Dispatch by T.V. Parasuram.

25. D.R. Mankekar, Twenty-two Fateful Days: Pakistan Cut to Size (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967), p. 33; Indian casualties estimated at 93 against Pakistan's 350.

26. G.W. Choudhury, n. 7, p. 288.

27. General J.N. Chaudhuri, India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies (New Delhi: United Services Institution, 1973), pp. 12-13.

28. Russel Brines, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 288.

own American-aid equipped and American trained troops'[29] with an eye to the ensuing conflict in Kashmir.

While creating a sense of over-confidence in Pakistan,[30] the conflict brought about a general consensus and a certain degree of chauvinism[31] in India about taking a tough attitude in the case of any future military conflict with Pakistan.

For Pakistan, India's acceptance of arbitration was considered to be a notable gain as she could later use this precedence with respect to Kashmir.[32] She also probed U.S. reactions to her use of weapons received from the latter. For President Ayub and the Pakistan Army it was sort of a green signal.[33] Once the United States failed to restrain it in the Rann, it emboldened Pakistan, while India failed to exert due pressure on the United States, that surely posed a danger for the future.

INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT IN KASHMIR, 1965

Reorganisation in the Indian armed forces led Pakistan to

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29. Mankekar, n. 25, p. 52; Pakistan estimated the results in a rather over-optimistic way. Because of difficulties of terrain and its own strategy, Indian forces did not launch a counter-offensive there.

30. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (Praeger, 1972), p. 200.

31. Gupta, n. 12, pp. 327-336; for serious protests in India against the ceasefire Agreement by the Jana Sangh, P.S.P. and S.S.P. parties; also see, Keesing's, n. 4, p. 20929.

32. Keesing's, idem.; Prime Minister Shastri denied it.

33. M.A. Khan, Air Marshal, Pakistan Air Force, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War, 1965 (London: Islamic Information Services, 1979), p. 74.

force the issue in Kashmir before it was too late.[34] Since 1964, violations and incidents on the ceasefire-line in Kashmir showed an upward trend and between January to May, 1965, these numbered 1,347, while between 1949 to 1962, they added up to 1,381.[35] Having probed Indian defence capability in Kutch, where the booming of guns had just died down, on August 5, 1965, Pakistan launched an offensive in Jammu and Kashmir codenamed Operation Gibraltar[36] under which several thousand armed men crossed into Indian territory which India assessed as a thinly veiled armed attack.[37] Pakistan initially denied the Indian allegations, but later admitted it[38] and the Indian forces had to take resort to hot pursuit of the infiltrators.[39]

The Pakistan Army crossed the ceasefire-line on September 1, 1965. By September 5, 1965, they approached Akhnur, creating a serious threat to the Indian position in Kashmir, to relieve which the Indian forces launched a major counteroffensive on September 6, 1965, towards Lahore closely followed by another towards Sialkot[40] to contain which thrust Pakistan threw in its formidable armour in the process of which the greatest tank warfare since the Second

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34. R.P.Stebbins, U.S. in World Affairs, 1965 (New York: Harper, 1966), p. 216.
35. Keesing's, n. 4, p. 21060B, for details.
36. M.A. Khan, n. 33, pp. 74-76, for the operation and its premises; author confirms that the plan had been initiated towards the end of 1964, see p. X, ibid.
37. R. Brines, n. 28, pp. 304-5.
38. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's Broadcast to the Nation, All India Radio (August 13, 1965); also Brines, ibid., p. 320.
39. New York Times, September 1, 1965.
40. General J.N. Chaudhuri, An Autobiography (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), pp. 188-89, for Indian strategy.

World War till that date took place in the Khem Karan area and in which a very large number of sophisticated Patton tanks were destroyed by the Indian forces.[41]

This conflict saw land, air as well as naval action. The Pakistan Navy bombarded the Indian part of Dwaraka in the province of Gujarat (September 8, 1965).[42]

CEASEFIRE

For the international community, this full-scale military conflict was an alarming development and the United Nations[43] Secretary General, U. Thant, took it up with serious concern which he expressed to the Pakistan representative at the United Nations even prior to the full-scale conflict on August 9, 1965 on the issue of crossing the ceasefire-line by the infiltrators and also urged India for restraint. On August 24, 1965, U. Thant drew attention to the serious and dangerous threat to peace in Kashmir and on the 1st of September, 1965, called upon the combatants for withdrawal of forces and ceasefire. On September 3, 1965, U. Thant, in a report to the U.N. Security Council again drew attention to the Kashmir situation. On September 4, 1965, the Council called for ceasefire, and withdrawal of forces to *status quo ante* (August 5, 1965). In his efforts to resolve the conflict, the Secretary General himself visited both the countries (September 9-15,1965).

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41. Ibid., p. 194; also, M.A. Khan, n. 33, p. 95.

42. Keesing's, n.4, pp.21104-21107,on details of the conflict.

43. Ibid.,pp. 21105-6, 21108-21110, for details of ceasefire efforts.

Finally, on September 20, 1965, the Security Council adopted a resolution demanding of the parties to accept ceasefire from September 22, 1965, which was subsequently fortified by the resolutions of September 27, 1965, and of November 5, 1965, calling for the strict observance of the ceasefire.

Besides the U.N. efforts, President Johnson and Premiers Kosygin and Wilson as well as President Nasser also had appealed for peace.

ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICT

The second[44] Kashmir conflict of 1965 which was also Pakistan's first all-out conflict with India, however, ended in a military stalemate.[45] Pakistan failed to capture Kashmir by force which it had so long also failed to achieve through diplomacy.

Taking into consideration the sophisticated U.S. weapons,[46] as well as the training imparted to the Pakistan forces by the United States, the Indian forces could certainly claim some credit, specially, in terms of mechanised warfare, which achievement,

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44. Despite M.A. Khan's title, see, n. 33, it was the second conflict over Kashmir.

45. A. Borchgrave (Senior editor, Newsweek), All India Radio Broadcast (November 22, 1965); also New York Times (October 12, 1965): "In fact, the opposing forces were much more evenly matched than imagined" ...; also see, Hindu Weekly (October 4, 1965) for Genl. J.N. Chaudhuri's opinion; also, Keesing's, n. 4, p. 211108, for the General's assessment.

46. Idem., New York Times, opined, "In the hands of the relatively uneducated Pakistani soldier the highly complicated Patton tanks were virtually useless".

actually, created a sense of confidence as well as pride in its armed forces in India. It also definitely proved the soundness of the Indian defence policy of achieving self-reliance in defence and, indeed, very much reemphasised it.

In Pakistan, failure to accept the realities led to a decline in the leadership of President Ayub and was pregnant with the possibilities for his future.[47]

This short conflict also pointed out to both the countries that it was a luxury which they could hardly afford[48] (cost estimated at five hundred million dollars).

THE UNITED STATES AND THE KASHMIR CONFLICT (1965)

During the Rann of Kutch conflict, the United States had 'lent its wholehearted support to the peacemaking efforts of Prime Minister Harold Wilson'[49] and was ffrequently in touch with India and Pakistan for the purpose. Its main predicament was that arms supplied for the protection of the free-world against Communism were used between its friend and its ally.[50]

The very same problem, though with a larger dimension,

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47. M.A. Khan, n. 33, p. xviii.

48. H.R. Gupta, India-Pakistan War, 1965, Vol. 2 (Delhi: Haryana Prakashan, 1968), p. 20; also Keesing's, no. 4, p. 21108, for estimates of casualties.

49. R.P. Stebbins, n. 34, p. 217.

50. Idem., for U.S. opinion that 'both side' were responsible on the count. Hence, Indian and U.S. assessments differ.

reappeared during the Kashmir conflict (1965). On August 29, 1965, President Johnson, at a press conference, expressed concern over any flare-up between India and Pakistan. He also observed: "Our longstanding and our very consistent stance has always been that the Kashmir issue must, and should be solved by peaceful means". He also wished success of the United Nations Secretary-General's initiative and emphasised U.S. "massive assistance" and deep attachment to the subcontinent.[51]

In furtherance of the U.S. policy in the conflict, the U.S. Representative in the Security Council (and also the President of the Council in September, 1965), Arthur J. Goldberg played a significant role in the cessation of the hostilities. In an appeal to India and Pakistan, on September 4, 1965, he said: "We pray that the parties involved will hear our voices and draw back from the catastrophe which threatens them and threatens all of us".[52]

In view of the Chinese ultimatum to India (September 16, 1965),[53]

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51. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 61; also see, Dept. of State Bulletin (September 13, 1965), p. 509, for the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's appeal for peaceful settlement (August 27, 1965).

52. American Foreign Policy, n. 51, p. 803.

53. S.C. Gogia (ed.), The Fight for Peace: The Long Road to Tashkent (New Delhi: Hardy and Ally, 1966), pp. 184-86, for extracts from the Chinese ultimatum and Indian reply as well as the Prime Minister's statement in the Lok Sabha (September 17, 1965). While India rejected the ultimatum, the United States and the U.S.S.R. warned China against any intervention, while the Chinese move, at least, for the time being, put Pakistan in an embarrassing position; see also, M.A. Khan, n. 33, pp. 37-41, 47-49, for a Pakistani version.

Goldberg declared in the Security Council on September 18, 1965: "a ceasefire between India and Pakistan ... is imperatively necessary today. And it is doubly necessary that our voices be raised against any efforts to spread the conflict and exploit what is already a tragedy".[54]

To tackle the Chinese threat Indian and U.S. defence officials undertook consultations; while the United States through its Ambassador in the Warsaw talks with the Chinese, J.M. Cabot, conveyed her warning to China to keep clear of the Indo-Pak hostilities.[55] The United States, reportedly, had threatened aerial intervention in case of any Chinese attack on India's northern frontier.[56] To the United States, the Chinese move appeared to be a 'further extension of the aggressive tactics it was resisting' then in Vietnam,[57] while in reality, she had not 'the faintest desire to become directly involved in a second war in Asia, particularly, one involving China itself'.[58] China, however, assessed it as U.S. imperialist support to Indian reactionaries.[59]

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54. American Foreign Policy, n. 51, p. 805.

55. The Washington Post (September 19, 1965); also Keesing's, n. 4, p. 21118 on the withdrawal of the Chinese ultimatum on September 21, 1965.

56. W.E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations: 1964-65", China Quarterly, (January-March, 1966), p. 117.

57. R.P. Stebbins, n. 34, p. 346.

58. Ibid., p. 222.

59. New York Times (September 21, 1965); also, The Washington Post (September 30, 1965); for Indian contingency plan, see, J.N. Chaudhuri, Autobiography, n. 40, p. 193.

The press in the United States took serious note of the Sino-Pak understanding. The New York Herald Tribune (August 23, 1965) observed that Pakistan's relations with the West "will surely become more strained", while the Washington Post (September 9, 1965) assessed that the Chinese support to Pakistan consisted of "the creation of a diversion that compels India to engage on another front". The New York Herald Tribune (September 15, 1965) went to the extent that in case of any Chinese intervention "the face of the world would be changed radically" while the New York Times (September 18, 1965) evaluated the Chinese ultimatum as "bullying ... deliberately timed to cause consternation"[60].

Alike the Kutch conflict, in this case too, the use of U.S. weapons raised the controversy again. The Washington Post (September 3, 1965) took note of reports about Pakistan's use of the Patton tanks and predicted that the 'already sorely strained relations between this country [U.S.A.- R.B.] and Pakistan will be further inflamed". But the diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times, in a report (September 4, 1965) hinted that the United States was unlikely to do anything over the issue, while the New York Herald Tribune (September 5, 1965) considered it "mandatory for the USA to do what it can" to prevent misuse of American weapons, and if necessary, to withdraw them from combat.

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60. See also, K.B. Sayeed, "Pakistan and China: The Scope and Limits of Convergent Politics", in A.M. Halpern (ed.), Policies Toward China: Views From Six Continents (McGraw Hill, 1965), pp. 233-248, 255-261, on the growth of Sino-Pak relations.

On the 8th of September, 1965, the United States stopped all arms supplies to India and Pakistan.[61] On September 9, 1965, the New York Times editorially commented that as neither of the belligerents had the necessary ability to conduct a long campaign, suspension of military supplies in the absence of any outside intervention could ensure that "the war can be contained". The Washington Post (September 14, 1965) held that the United States "does have some responsibility" for the war because of her military aid commitment to Pakistan.

Pakistan, dependent as she had predominantly been on U.S. military supplies, felt the pinch of the stoppage of arms aid quickly and bitterly, while in India the successful destruction of a large number of Pakistan's U.S. supplied Patton tanks some of which were carried away as trophies caused significant excitement leading to enough embarrassment to the United States.[62]

India felt quite aggrieved that the United States had failed to prevent the use of U.S. arms while Pakistan also felt let down and each suspected United States of connivance with the other.[63] To

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61. Keesing's, n.4,p.21117, on the suspension of U.S.military and economic aid to both India and Pakistan; also see, Asian Recorder, 1965, p. 6790, on the issue and Indian resentment regarding stoppage of arms aid as placing the victim and the aggressor on a par,which the Government of India considered as unjust.

62. New York Times (September 8,1965),on aid stoppage being fortified by diplomatic pressure also; also S.M.Burke, Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Oxford University Press, 1974), p.189, on Pakistan's reaction; also L. Bedindranath, War With Pakistan (Delhi: Asia Press, 1966),p. 188, for Pakistani High Commissioner in London, Agha Hilaly's statement (September 13, 1965).

63. Brines, n. 28, p. 303; also see, M.A. Khan, n. 33, Ch.IX and specially p. 89 therein.

India, it appeared that all her apprehensions since 1954 had, unfortunately, proved correct.[64] On September 3, 1965, the Indian Ambassador, B.K. Nehru, lodged a strong protest with the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, against Pakistan's use of U.S.Patton tanks, F-104 supersonic fighters and F-86 Sabre jets against India. But this had little effect as the Indian Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh told the Lok Sabha (September 20, 1965) that the U.S. Government 'had more or less "confessed its inability" to do anything about its assurances that arms supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India'.[65]

Pakistan's CENTO allies, Iran and Turkey had also helped Pakistan. Turkey announced (September 10, 1965) supply of arms and ammunition worth five million dollars to their ally while Iran offered oil, medical supplies and a field hospital which led India to appeal to the United States to ensure that U.S. arms did not reach Pakistan via third countries.[66]

Pakistan had also used NATO anti-tank missiles and the United States supplied six-burst mines along with Napalm bombs which have been 'considered inhuman in war conventions' as these turn 'human beings into ash'; while it came to be known later that[67]

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64. Gegia, n. 53, p. 383; also see, W.J. Fulbright, Arrogance of Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), p. 229, for similar opinion by J.K. Galbraith.

65. Keesing's, n. 4, p. 21117.

66. Idem.

67. Asian Recorder, 1965, pp. 6708-9.

Pakistan had also used the U.S. submarine Diablo renamed Ghazi, in the naval operations against India.[68]

Later on, Prime Minister Shastri came to be quoted in the Washington Post as declaring that any resumption of military aid to Pakistan would be "palpably wrong and could impose a very severe strain on our relations".[69] However, on March 2, 1966, it was reported that the United States had agreed to resume the sale of "non-lethal" military hardware to the erstwhile combatants wherein the fine distinction between lethal and non-lethal items remained an issue connected with political and diplomatic considerations.[70]

As the United States resumed arms supplies to Pakistan in April, 1967, it drew this Indian observation: 'only the completely ignorant, or the utterly naive, could be taken in by the American declaration that it would not be military aid as such, "only cash and carry spare parts for all".[71]

CONCLUSION

The India-Pakistan conflicts of 1965 indicated 'failure of U.S. policy in the subcontinent',[72] as she failed to fulfil her

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68. Ibid., pp. 6790-91.

69. Ibid., p. 6813.

70. Keesing's, 1965-66, p. 21364; U.K. also announced her decision (March 21, 1966) to resume the sale of arms to both the countries which it had also stopped earlier on September 8,1965.

71. S.S. Khera, India's Defence Problem (Orient Longmans, 1968), p. 121.

72. Barnds, n. 30, p. 205.

strategy of consolidating the two countries against international Communism. Instead, the weapons supplied by her had helped unleash the outbreak of an internecine strife which created further bad blood between the countries directly involved as well as against the United States herself.

While these conflicts ended more or less in a stalemate in the military sense, it also failed to change another stalemate, a political as well as diplomatic one, in India-U.S. relations—namely, the U.S. conviction that 'the United States can side with Pakistan and yet keep hold on India'.[73] However, the U.S. promptness with regard to the potential Chinese intervention somewhat managed to mend the deterioration of her relationship with India.

If the military setbacks of 1962 made India conscious of the basic needs of her defence, the conflicts of 1965 definitely strengthened her convictions on the necessity of having a self-reliant defence structure so as to protect her territorial integrity and independence against military onslaughts as well as pressures from abroad, diplomatic and otherwise. These conflicts also emphasized to the Indian leadership the need for sophisticated military hardware which India had failed to procure from the United States and its allies, and stood somewhat chastened and disillusioned.[74]

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73. D.R. Mankekar, n. 25, p. 186.

74. R.G.C. Thomas, The Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics (Macmillan, India, 1978), pp.163-64, 189-90, 211-12, for effects of U.S. embargo of 1965, on India's defence collaboration with the United States.

Hence, they had to look up to the Soviet Union.[75] In this sense, these conflicts further strengthened the parting of ways between the United States and Indian approaches to the subcontinent. The shortlived honeymoon of 1962 was rapidly coming to a close, foreshadowing, in a sense, the shape of things to come in the next decade.

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75. Brines, n. 28, p. 365, for uninterrupted Indo-Soviet negotiations on defence even during the conflict.

CHAPTER VII

THE TASHKENT CONFERENCE (1966)

A Diplomatic Impasse

Though the Kashmir conflict (1965) came to a close on and from September 23, 1965, when the shooting formally stopped[1] the ceasefire, unfortunately, was not very effective, and forces had not been withdrawn,[2] which forced the Security Council to adopt two more resolutions (No. 214, September 27, 1965, and No. 215, November 5, 1965), which expressed grave concern, and also regretted the delay in the implementation of effective ceasefire and withdrawal of forces.[3] It was actually an uneasy truce. Hence, there was 'an urgent need for military disengagement and for passions to subside'.[4]

The conflict had created bitter anti-U.S. sentiments both in India and in Pakistan, as a result of which the United States could not take any diplomatic initiative for achieving a breakthrough in this dangerous impasse,[5] while the British Prime Minister's statement on the conflict (September 6, 1965) had created misunderstanding in India, thereby blocking the scope of

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1. This was in pursuance of the U.N. Security Council Resolution No.211 (September 20,1965). For text, see D. Sharma, Tashkent: The Fight for Peace: A Study in Foreign Relations with Documents (Varanasi: Gandhian Institute of Studies, 1966), pp.93-4.

2. S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 340.

3. D. Sharma, n. 1, pp. 94-95.

4. W.J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (Praeger, 1972), p. 209.

5. Ibid., p. 210; also, L.P. Singh, India's Foreign Policy: The Shastri Period (New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1980), p. 98; T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War (Vikas, 1979), p. 159.

any British initiative also.[6]

SOVIET INITIATIVE

In this critical situation, the Soviet Union was left out as the only major power enjoying some sort of credibility with both the parties, and, which, all along the conflicts of 1965, had constantly urged for restraint.

On May 8, 1965, the TASS expressed the hope of the Soviet official sources that the Kutch dispute would be settled peacefully 'with consideration for the interests of both sides'.[7] The late Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin wrote (August 20, 1965) to both his Indian counterpart and to the President of Pakistan appealing to them to resolve the conflict peacefully while the PRAVDA[8] on the same date, also appealed for the settlement of the new conflict in Kashmir and declared 'Soviet-Pakistan' and 'Soviet-Indian' friendship as a 'stabilising factor in Asia', which facilitated 'normalisation of the relations between Pakistan and India'.[9] On September 4, 1965, Kosygin reminding India and Pakistan of his previous letter, again appealed to them to stop the bloodshed and offered that 'both sides could rely on the good offices of the

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6. A.K. Banerji, India and Britain, 1947-68: The Evolution of Post-Colonial Relations (Calcutta: Minerva, 1977), pp.122-30, for Wilson's statement and relevant details; and The Times (London), September 7, 1965.

7. Asian Recorder, 1965, p. 6464.

8. Official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

9. D. Sharma, n. 1, p. 141.

Soviet Union, if they deemed it useful'[10]; which was followed by another message (September 17, 1965) suggesting to them to meet 'in Tashkent ... or any other city in the Soviet Union ... and start negotiations'[11].

INDIAN AND PAKISTANI REACTIONS

Prime Minister Shastri stated in the Lok Sabha (September 22, 1965) that he had positively replied to the Soviet Premier welcoming his efforts and good offices[12].

Initially, however, both India and Pakistan had their reservations. It has been reported that the initial Indian reaction had been in the negative[13]. Pakistan also had its apprehensions both on grounds of its view of Soviet Union's pro-India stance as well as for fear of losing goodwill in the United States[14]. Subsequently, President Ayub undertook a tour of the United States in December, 1965[15] and discussed the forthcoming Tashkent Conference with President Johnson, which was followed by another meeting with the roving U.S. Ambassador, A. Harriman, at Peshawar on

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10. Ibid., pp. 143-44.
11. Ibid., p. 145.
12. Idem.
13. K. Nayar, India: The Critical Years (Vikas, 1971), p. 196; also, T.N. Kaul, n.5, p. 159; 'Some top Soviet leaders assured me that it was not a shift in the Soviet policy against India, but an attempt to wean Pakistan away from the Western and Chinese influence; also, p. 161.
14. Washington Post (October 11, 1965), reported that President Ayub wanted Anglo-U.S. initiative, failing which, he would accept the Soviet offer; also, Dawn (September 26, 1965).
15. Keesing's, 1965-66, p. 21166, for details.

January 3, 1966, just prior to the Tashkent Conference. As the Soviet initiative proved to be 'the only possible chance'[16] for a settlement, and as the United States also supported the Soviet initiative,[17] Pakistan, ultimately, accepted it, which her Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto announced on November 11, 1965, and which Kosygin intimated to Premier Shastri on November 16, 1965. The latter declared India's willingness for talks on all issues except Kashmir, and subsequently, on December 8, 1965, it was, simultaneously, announced in Karachi, Moscow and New Delhi, that the talks would start at Tashkent[18] on January 4, 1966.

Prior to the Conference, both India and Pakistan sent their Foreign Ministers to the Soviet Union for consultations with the hosts.[19]

India aimed at achieving a 'No-War Declaration';[20] and held the Kashmir issue non-negotiable, while Pakistan aimed at a solution of the Kashmir "dispute"[21] throughout the Conference. Such contradictory approaches, declared prior to the Conference, raised doubts about any bright prospect for the same with The Times (London: January 3, 1966) commenting that the Soviet Union was trying to open 'a back

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16. Burke, n. 2, p. 350.

17. M.S. Rajan, 'The Tashkent Declaration Retrospect and Prospect', International Studies (New Delhi: July-October, 1966), pp. 5-6.

18. Situated in Central Asia, Tashkent is the capital of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.

19. Delegation headed by Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, visited the Soviet Union on and from November 23-25, 1965; See Asian Recorder, 1966, p. 6882.

20. Times of India, January 2, 1966.

21. The Hindustan Times, January 2, 1966.

that has no key'.

THE CONFERENCE

The Conference[22] started on January 4, 1966, at Tashkent, the ancient Soviet Central Asian city, as the host, having assembled a formidable team, headed by Premier Kosygin, for assisting in the process of negotiations, as and when necessary, and the parties, India and Pakistan, sent equally appropriate delegations, headed by Premier Shastri and President Ayub, respectively.

In his inaugural speech, the Soviet Premier offered "to render good offices" to these "southern neighbours" of the Soviet Union "to find a way to peace" so that 1966 could be "a year of the establishment of good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan"[23].

Prime Minister Shastri, in his speech noted that it was "a momentous meeting" and that people in both the countries needed "not arms and ammunition, but food, clothing and shelter" and also wanted to "improve the totality of the relationship" between the two countries, however, on the foundation of "renouncing the use of force" between them[24].

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22. Keesing's, 1965-66, pp. 21187-89; also, Asian Recorder, 1966, pp. 6896-98, for details.

23. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, The Tashkent Declaration (Delhi 1967), pp. 14-16, for full text.

24. Ibid., pp. 17-19.

President Ayub, while noting the "great opportunity" to resolve Indo-Pakistan "dispute on a peaceful, just and honourable basis", wanted the Conference "to face up to the basic problem which continues to create tension and conflict", only after which a no-war pact could be concluded.[25]

As it could be expected, the negotiations were 'a tough going for a whole week'[26], wherein the basis was 'patient, preserving, polite' and never 'pressurizing either delegation'.[27] No doubt, Kosygin played a crucial role for making the Conference a success by way of using his good offices for achieving a reconciliation among the parties concerned.[28] On January 10, 1966, the Tashkent Declaration was signed by President Ayub and Premier Shastri with Premier Kosygin as the witness to the ceremony.

THE TASHKENT DECLARATION

The Declaration[29] consists of nine clauses along with an introductory statement, which declared the firm resolve of the

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25. Ibid., pp. 20-22.

26. T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections (Vikas, 1979), p. 164; also, R. Chandra, The Tashkent Spirit (New Delhi: Communist Party Publication, 1966), p. 22; "These were seven days of patient search for mutually acceptable situations" - A.N. Kosygin.

27. Kaul, Ibid., p. 165; also, K. Nayar, Distant Neighbours (Vikas, 1972), p. 122, for a different version that Kosygin 'used all his persuation as well as pressure' on both Shastri and Ayub and 'saved the situation'.

28. M.S. Rajan, n. 17, p. 11.

29. The Tashkent Declaration, n. 23, pp.4-6, for text.

parties concerned "to restore normal and peaceful relations" between their countries and peoples.

Clause I reaffirmed the obligation of the parties "under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means", and also noted that on Jammu and Kashmir, which was discussed, the parties "set forth ... respective position", while Clause II specified that they had agreed to withdraw "all armed personnel by February 25, 1966, at the latest, to the status quo ante of August 5, 1965.

The Declaration also affirmed the resolve of the parties about non-interference in their internal affairs, discouraging hostile propaganda, normalisation of diplomatic functioning, restoration of economic and cultural relations as well as communication and discussions on problems connected with refugees, and, last but not the least, consultations on matters of mutual interest.

ASSESSMENT

The Tashkent Declaration was in the nature of a compromise. 'Ayub received no specific guarantee of further talks on the political future of Kashmir, and Shastri failed to get the "no war" pact he sought'.[30] However, it was quite in the fitness of things, as in any diplomatic agreement, both the parties have to be conciliatory, otherwise, either no agreement or a surrender by

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30. R.H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy Toward India (Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 209.

one side to the other can be achieved. As a Pakistani scholar, Burke aptly puts it, the Conference 'opened a way out of the terrible impasse created by the war in September, 1965 ... it was no guarantee that the countries would live in peace as good neighbours, but it certainly eased the explosive situation created by the war'[31] while an influential American author, Barnds, concludes that 'the agreement did not solve the basic problem dividing the two countries; it merely represented a willingness to move toward the _status quo ante_'.[32]

Prime Minister Shastri thought that the Declaration had achieved 'very tangible results ... a concrete step has been taken toward the restoration of genuinely peaceful relations',[33] and emphasised that a failure would have led to further conflagration,[34] and was reported to have told the Indian Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan: "Now we have to fight for peace with all our strength".[35]

The Pakistani delegation declared it to be 'a victory for common sense', while President Ayub hoped that the Declaration would contribute to the solution of the Kashmir problem.[36]

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31. G.W. Choudhury, _Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966_ (London: Pall Mall, 1968), p. 302.

32. _Barnds_, n. 4, p. 211; _Burke_, n. 2, p. 351; for a similar Pakistani view: 'a face-saving compromise'.

33. _R. Chandra_, n. 26, p. 23.

34. _Times of India_, January 11, 1966.

35. _Ibid._, January 12, 1966.

36. _Dawn_ (Karachi), January 11, 1965.

Premier Kosygin considered the Declaration to be "a major political document" which "marks a new stage in the development of relations between India and Pakistan, puts an end to the military conflict, indicates ways of overcoming difficulties that hamper normalisation of relations between the two major Asian powers, and ... furnishes real foundations for conditions of peace in that highly important area of Asia"[37].

An Indian diplomat assessed the Declaration as 'an epitome of Indo-Soviet friendship'[38], while another who was a participant in the Conference characterised it as an 'opportunity for both to make a fresh start and open a new chapter in their post-independence relations ... the first step, the beginning'[39], while even another concluded that the Declaration made possible 'the gradual construction of elements of the primary of relations that is required on the sub-continent'[40].

The U.S. President, L.B. Johnson, on January 10, 1966, warmly welcomed the Agreement and the United States welcomed it as it went towards reducing tension in the sub-continent[41], while

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37. R. Chandra, n. 26, p. 21.

38. K.P.S. Menon, Tashkent: An Episode or An Epitome? (New Delhi: National Book Club, 1966), p. 12.

39. T.N. Kaul, n. 26, p. 167.

40. K.P. Misra (ed.), Foreign Policy of India (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1977), p. 151, for opinion of A. Lall.

41. Asian Recorder, 1966, p. 6898.

the British Premier H. Wilson, found "an agreement ... on the first limited objective ... namely, the withdrawal of troops ... satisfactory and to be welcomed".[42]

REACTION IN INDIA

Tragedy struck India with the sudden demise of the Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, at Tashkent (January 11, 1966). The Government of India, however, reiterated its determination to follow and implement the Tashkent Declaration, as the Acting Prime Minister, G.L. Nanda, who was sworn in on the same day, declared in a broadcast to the nation that the erstwhile Premier had "died a hero after successfully concluding an intense and mighty effort for winning an honourable peace. We shall honour the Agreement that he made and shall implement it faithfully".[43] However, while the 'overwhelming majority of opinion in Press, Parliament and outside warmly welcomed it',[44] it came to be opposed by the Jana Sangh, the S.S.P., the Hindu Mahasabha and also a section of the ruling Congress Party,[45] which led to the resignation of Mahavir Tyagi, the Union Minister for Rehabilitation (January 13, 1966).[46]

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42. Idem.

43. Asian Recorder, 1966, p. 6902; see, Keesing's, 1965-66, p. 21204, for the new Premier Mrs. Indira Gandhi's views.

44. M.S. Rajan, n. 17, p. 14.

45. Asian Recorder, 1966, p. 6912, for Jana Sangh criticism, see also D. Sharma, n. 1, p. 25.

46. Keesing's, 1965-66, p. 21205.

IN PAKISTAN

In Pakistan also, a section reacted against the Agreement strongly as student demonstrations broke out, fortified by a section of the Opposition, which joined the fray to launch an attack on President Ayub, with Miss Fatima Jinnah declaring (January 22, 1966) that the Declaration betrayed a "lack of sagacity, wisdom, foresight and vision" while an Opposition Conference at Lahore (February 5, 1966) condemned it bitterly as having compromised Pakistan's case over Kashmir,[47] which led President Ayub to declare (January 23, 1966) that the Declaration had not taken away the right of self-determination from the people of Kashmir, leading to a reply from the Indian Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh (January 30, 1966) that the Declaration had not brought about any change in the Indian attitude to the Kashmir problem.[48]

IMPLEMENTATION

However, by the beginning of March, 1966, in accordance with the Agreement, disengagement and withdrawal of troops, return of diplomatic representatives, exchange of prisoners of war and internees had been achieved, air-traffic and communications were restored, and steps were taken for suspension of hostile propaganda while the ministerial talks were conducted in Rawalpindi.

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47. Ibid., pp. 21325-26.

48. L. Sharma, n. 1, pp. 155, 157.

THE VICIOUS CIRCLE

As the forces opposed to the Tashkent spirit asserted themselves in both the countries, they came to be identified by the Indian Peace Council as 'imperialist interference', 'Indian reaction' and 'Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto and his supporters'.[49]

The agonising process after Tashkent has led an Indian author to conclude: 'It did not take long for the two countries to accuse each other of violating the Tashkent spirit - a spirit that never was'.[50]

Actually, on March 2, 1966, while the parties reflected their divergences in the ministerial meeting[51] without any progress, that very day the United States announced its decision to resume the sale of "non-lethal" military hardware to both India and Pakistan with the distinction between "lethal" and "non-lethal" military supplies depending on political considerations'[52], with the British following suit (March 21, 1966)[53] and the Indian Foreign Minister alleging in the Lok Sabha (March 23, 1966) that as the Pakistani official media had started anti-Indian campaign anew, it would be difficult for India to observe restraint.[54] The vicious circle, once again, unfortunately, was complete.

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49. R. Chandra, n. 26, pp. 11-12.
50. L.P. Singh, n. 5, p. 103.
51. Keesing's, 1965-66, p. 21327.
52. Ibid., p. 21364.
53. Idem.; the British also had suspended arms aid on September 8, 1965.
54. Supra, n. 52.

SIGNIFICANCE

In retrospect, while the gains of the Tashkent Conference appear to be limited, only when one places the same in the context of the military conflict preceding it one can judge its contribution to peace in the unlucky sub-continent.

No doubt, it definitely signified 'a victory for the Soviet diplomacy'[55] and raised the Soviet Union's 'reputation as a peace-maker in Asia and, thus, contributed to increasing Soviet prestige'[56], while the Indian scholar M.S. Rajan aptly called it 'a moment of unmitigated triumph'[57] for the U.S.S.R.

In arranging the Tashkent Conference, the Soviet Union had definitely undertaken 'a calculated risk'[58] and its success has been attributed 'largely due to the scrupulous neutrality it maintained'[59]. Throughout the Conference, parity was maintained even in the number of banners, flags and friendly slogans. Pravda published 'equal size photographs'[60] of Shastri and Ayub.

Tashkent also meant a rebuff to China as a trouble-shooter

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55. J. Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Co-Existence (Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 204.

56. L. Ziring (ed.), The Subcontinent in World Politics (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 226.

57. Supra, n. 17, p. 22.

58. T.N. Kaul, n. 26, p. 161.

59. M.S. Rajan, n. 17, p. 22.

60. V. Chawla, India and the Super Powers (Jaipur: Panchsheel, 1973), p. 96.

in the region. It had been undertaken only after a 'careful consideration of the broad Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Asia'[61], which led Peking, subsequently, to denounce it while accusing the Soviet Union of 'cooperation with the U.S. imperialism in encircling China'[62].

Tashkent also definitely signified a decline of the Western influence in vital issues like peace-making in the subcontinent, typified by the lament in The Times (London, January 3, 1966): "How strange and intolerable it would have seemed to Curzon that the affairs of the sub-continent he ruled should be taken to Tashkent to be discussed under the patronage of a Russian", while the Indian Express (New Delhi) observed on the same day: "If independence of India and Pakistan were the beginning of the end of the Western empire in Asia, the Tashkent meeting is the end of that beginning".

Though President Johnson, in his New Year broadcast had hoped that the United States would be able to play a constructive role in bringing about "the essential normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan"[63], however, that the same could be achieved only under the auspices of the U.S.S.R., in a way, clearly brought out the emerging trends in the troubled sub-continent. The United States had supplied the weapons, which Pakistan, its ally, had largely

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61. R.P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1966 (New Harper and Row, 1967), p. 218.

62. D. Sharma, n. 1, p. 158, for Peking Daily comment (February 3, 1966).

63. Ibid., p. 148.

used in the conflict, in the end, however, failing to achieve its military and political objectives. The way out, lay through a Soviet initiative which also signified the end of the West's 'sly pretence of impartial friendship between India and Pakistan'[64], and, at the same time, placed the responsibility, at least partly, for the bloodbath, on them. It remained a very significant and painful lesson for the peoples of the sub-continent.

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64. M.S. Rajan, n. 17, p. 23.

CONCLUSION

The United States represents the most powerful democracy while India enjoys the pride of place as the biggest democracy on earth. Hence, they constitute sort of an unwritten alliance based on certain common values and ideals.

Historically British colonialism had provided a very important link between these two countries. The great ideals of the American Revolution came to inspire the Indian struggle for freedom years later and many a glorious role came to be played by private individuals and groups in the United States who stood by India. However, the role of the official United States with respect to the Indian struggle was far from commendable. While Theodore Roosevelt, in the first Presidential stand, had identified himself with British colonialism in toto, decades later, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, too, failed to identify the United States with a resurgent Indian to any substantial extent. This led to bitter disillusionment in this country which boded ill for the future.

By the end of the last century, the United States had emerged into the international arena as a firm ally of her erstwhile masters and they saw through the two World Wars together. This grand alliance enjoyed a much higher priority than the Indian cause in the United States' scheme of things, and the British connexion has, time and again, led the official United States to look at India through the distorted prism of British imperialism. It must also be noted that the occasional interest displayed by the highest decision-makers in the United States came to be limited to their strategic interests in the region.

Conscious of the impending dangers inherent in the tribulent international scenario after the end of the Second World War, the Indian leadership came to be aptly guided by the vital interests of security and economic development. They were pragmatic enough to launch the newly-born state on an independent and peaceful course in international relations so as to steer clear of the Cold War. Hence, the innovation of non-alignment.

While the containment of Communism became the watchward of United States foreign policy in that phase, India, strictly in keeping with her own interests sought a zone of peace, and friendship with both the sides of the Cold War. Besides this, the rise of Communist power in China, and the Korean War were the major Asian issues where the United States and Indian approaches came to differ, leading to a very sharp reaction in the United States against India.

Immediately after independence, Pakistan's animus against India led her to the invasion of Kashmir which constituted a threat to the security of India and which also sought to strike at the very fundamentals of the Indian body politic. While the West had a role to play in initiating the Kashmir problem, mainly because of its strategic location, British pressures within led India to take the issue to the United Nations Security Council despite the advice of Gandhiji to the contrary, only to be taught some very costly lesson by the West, and which also contained within it the seeds of future disasters in the subcontinent. The United States stood by Pakistan throughout the fifties and exerted diplomatic

pressure quite oblivious of the initial Indian complaint as well as the very fact that it involved the vital interests of a new-born democracy which India withstood only with the help of the Soviet Union.

As Pakistan sought outside help vis-a-vis India, the United States also was on the look-out for military bases in this region, added to which came disillusionment with Indian foreign policy, more specifically its basic ingredient of non-alignment. This led to the conclusion of the United States - Pakistan military alliance and the latter's joining the SEATO and the CENTO. Added to the Kashmir issue, India very much resented this marriage of convenience which amounted to bolstering Pakistan on a future course of aggression on her. This initiated a serious clash of interests between India and the United States and led to a steady downward trend in their relations with immense implications for the future, to counteract which India had to look elsewhere.

The Suez and the Hungarian crises in the second half of the fifties, found ultimately India as well as the United States taking somewhat similar stands, which led to an upswing in their relations, though even these third-country issues did reveal some important differences in their approaches.

The beginning of the sixties saw the becoming of the guns on India's Himalayan frontiers which came as a godsend to the United States for cementing her ties with India in serious distress, which President Kennedy promptly achieved through despatch of emergency military airlift which earned Indian gratitude and improved the image of the United States in India.

However, the enforced opening of the Indo-Pakistan talks over the Kashmir issue achieved by the Harriman-Sandys Mission on the plea of the so-called joint defence of the sub-continent could not but lead to resentment in India. Opening the Kashmir Pandora's box did not bring any solution near but helped embitter Indie-United States relations raking up the painful memories of a not-too-distant past. It also proved how trivial, an issue so vital to India, appeared to the United States decision-makers.

The unprecedented military collaboration, once past the emergency airlift phase, was no smooth sailing either. The United States tagged the issue to the solution of the Kashmir problem. Despite the hoarse clamour of a section of opinion in India for massive military aid at any cost, the United States was never ready to go to that extent. Her alliance with Pakistan stood in the way. Hence, her aid consisted mostly of equipment for mountain warfare, which though blown out of proportion at that period in India, came to amount to less than half of the promised aid upto the beginning of the 1965 Kashmir conflict. The only tangible result was the joint-air-exercise which raised many a question in India and abroad and was held only once. Again, the installation of nuclear-powered gadgets in the Himalayas in secret remains questionable both as regards procedure as well as contents, and at the least, it appears to be a hazardous venture in every sense of the term.

Actually, while India sought self-reliance in defence, and sophisticated military hardware, so as to meet the twin menace of China and Pakistan, the United States did not like to go that far.

Another offshoot of this phase, the Voice of America deal, was a piece of quiet diplomacy which sought a partial negation of non-alignment through the backdoor. A vigilant public opinion, aided by an alert press correctly knocked the deal out, and forced the decision-makers to retrace their steps. While it created suspicion about the interests of the United States, it surely did not absolve the Indian leadership of their share of the dangerous vacillations. It also proved that non-alignment had struck its roots deep into India, strong enough to withstand by onslaughts from within as well as without.

On the political level, ouster of V.K. Krishna Menon, who had long been an eyesore to the United States, created apparent glee in some sections in India and abroad. However, Nehru, who happened to be also the architect of non-alignment, with the help of democratic opinion inside the country and without, could withstand the pressures to seek an alignment with the West and the United States. No doubt, in spite of the initial upswing in relations with the United States, it proved to be a short-lived phenomenon.

Very soon, however, India's mild criticism of the United States' Vietnam policy led President Johnson to react in a way which created sort of a diplomatic incident, leading to deterioration in India-United States relations. Even before India could forget the same, Pakistan forced the Kashmir issue to the battlefield to gain by force which it had failed to gain so long with the diplomatic help of her allies. Both in the probing in Kutch

and in the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan liberally used the United States weapons and equipment against India. As the United States did not restrain Pakistan, India found all her apprehensions on this issue since 1954 proved true in toto. However, as the conflict led to a stalemate, which brought discomfiture to an United States supplied and trained military dictatorship, it created a new confidence in India none of which could have been to the fulfilment of U.S. interests and these strengthened the downward trend in India-United States relations. The United States sought to protect her image through the arms supply ban, and her role to contain any potential Chinese move on the northern frontiers. Her initiatives inside the United Nations Security Council along with the Soviet Union and others went in the same direction, and helped contain the conflict.

That peace-making had to be completed on Soviet initiative to end a conflict in which United States weaponry had played a major role, marked a decline for United States leverage in the sub-continent. It led to much heartburning in London also. It signified a bold initiative which succeeded in taking the sub-continent away from the immediate catastrophic past.

Thus, while the British connexion posed a serious complication in India-United States relations in the colonial period, India's vital interests came into conflict with those practised by the United States in this region. The United States stand on Kashmir and supply of arms to Pakistan are among the basic problems in her relations with India. The 1962 honeymoon happened to be a

short-lived one as India came to resent United States pressures, and conscious of her new urgency for self-reliance in defence and advanced weaponary, came to realise that the United States interests did converge with her vital interests only temporarily. Nor was India willing to help in United States policy of containing China elsewhere in Asia. The bitter lesson was again brought home to her with the conflict with Pakistan soon, and which exploded to pieces many illusions. The arms supply policy to Pakistan, which lay at the root of the bloodbaths of 1965, was, however, soon after the peace making at Tashkent, initiated again by the United States, bringing home once again the fact that despite the unwritten alliance the written one was far more formidable. Hence, the United States, all along, sought to aid a military dictatorship to the chagrin of a sister democracy, proving once again that states are guided not by values but by their national interests. Hence, to protect her vital interests, India as this phase indicated, had to look elsewhere. This phase also revealed that the United States decision-makers had also a very low estimation of the Indian leadership. It taught the newly-awakened Indian nation, struggling hard for a place under the sun, to take a realistic look from the lessons derived these years which surely indicated the shape of things to come.

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